A ROADMAP TO PROGRESS

THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL P/CVE AGENDA

BY ERIC ROSAND, EMILY WINTERBOTHAM, MICHAEL JONES, FRANZISKA PRAXL-TABUCHI

September 2018
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ERIC ROSAND is the Director of The Prevention Project, a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Program’s Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, and the President and Founder of PVE Solutions. Until March 2016, he was a senior official at the U.S. Department of State, working on counterterrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Among other roles, he served as the department’s policy coordinator for the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism and its follow-on process. From 2010 to 2016, he helped spearhead the development and launch of a number of international counterterrorism and P/CVE initiatives, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, Hedayah, the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, and the Strong Cities Network. From 2006 to 2010, he was a codirector of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (now the Global Center on Cooperative Security), and served as a Non-Resident Fellow at New York University’s Center for International Cooperation. He has also served in the State Department’s Office of the Legal Advisor and the U.S. Mission to International Cooperation. He is the author of a number of reports, blogs, and op-eds and holds a BA in history from Haverford College, a JD from Columbia University School of Law, and an LLM (Hons) in international law from Cambridge University.

EMILY WINTERBOTHAM is a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) with over 10 years of experience in an international policy environment. Her recent projects include primary research on the drivers of radicalization and mobilization in Iraq and Afghanistan and a meta-level evaluation of P/CVE interventions. She also completed a five-country study (Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) on gender and radicalization and the role of women in P/CVE. In 2017, she helped set up the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Unit of the Commonwealth Secretariat. From 2009 to 2015 she worked in Afghanistan and Pakistan, latterly as a Political Adviser for the European Union (EU) Special Representative. From 2009 to 2011 she conducted in-depth, community-based qualitative research for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit on the impact of conflict and terrorism, conflict resolution, and reconciliation processes. She is also a Deployable Civilian Expert for the UK government’s Stabilization Unit.

MICHAEL JONES is a Research Analyst in the National Security and Resilience Team at RUSI on conflict and P/CVE. He has conducted research into terrorism, violent extremism, and insurgencies, with particular reference to East Africa and the Sahel. This includes fieldwork as a coinvestigator in Sudan and working in RUSI’s Nairobi office on a range of projects related to the EU’s Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) Horn of Africa and STRIVE II program in Kenya. In 2018 Michael was selected as a member of the Commonwealth’s CVE Panel of Experts. Before starting at RUSI, Michael was the Lead Researcher for the Institute of Islamic Strategic Affairs’ Africa Program, primarily analyzing the intersections between crime, local militancy, and transnational terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds an MSc in Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a BA Joint Hons in History and Politics from the University of Warwick.

FRANZISKA PRAXL-TABUCHI is the NGO coordinator for the Prevention Project and a Program Officer for the Global Center on Cooperative Security. She conducts research and contributes to the Global Center’s and Prevention Project’s programs on P/CVE. Previously she worked for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations and the New York City Council. She holds an MA in Transnational Security from New York University, specializing in counterterrorism and P/CVE, a MA in Contemporary Warfare from King’s College London and a BA in Social- and Cultural Anthropology from Freie Universität Berlin.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Prevention Project and RUSI gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the EU Commission for International Cooperation and Development and the government of Norway for this report, as well as the governments of Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom for support for P/CVE workshops and roundtables, which informed this report. The authors would like to thank the staff at the Global Center for Cooperative Security for their support, Georgía Holmer, Eelco Kessels, Chris Meserole, and Jessica Trisko-Darden for their feedback, and Ella Bowie and David Dews for their research and project support. The authors also wish to thank Omar Metwally and Mohammed Elshimi for providing invaluable research and editing assistance throughout the preparation of this report. The authors are also grateful to the numerous governmental and nongovernmental experts whose insights informed this report.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Prevention Project, RUSI, or the sponsors.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prevention Project</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendices</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Examples of P/CVE Initiatives Led by Civil Society Organizations or Other Local Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RUSI-led Prevention Project II Research Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boxes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Examples of P/CVE Networks Involving Civil Society Organizations or Other Local Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Examples of Multi-Disciplinary Hubs/Referral Mechanisms and Local Prevention Networks for P/CVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Examples of P/CVE Small-Grants Programs for Grassroots Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables 1 and 2</td>
<td>Available Literature on P/CVE Interventions by Region and Continent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Available Literature on P/CVE Interventions by Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Available Literature on P/CVE Interventions by Intervention Type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>foreign terrorist fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCERF</td>
<td>Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCTF</td>
<td>Global Counterterrorism Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSX</td>
<td>Global Solutions Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAN</td>
<td>International Civil Society Action Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJJ</td>
<td>International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM&amp;E</td>
<td>monitoring, measurement, and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/CVERLT</td>
<td>preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/CVE</td>
<td>preventing and countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPII</td>
<td>phase II of the Prevention Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>preventing violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRIVE</td>
<td>Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCN</td>
<td>Strong Cities Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICRI</td>
<td>United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCT</td>
<td>UN Office of Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN PVE Plan of Action</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASL</td>
<td>Women's Alliance for Security Leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Seventeen years after 11 September 2001, the international community is facing terrorist and violent extremist threats that are increasingly globally connected and locally rooted. Although the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has lost nearly all of the territory it once held, recent reports reveal that the group currently still has between 20,000–30,000 members in Iraq and Syria, including “thousands of active foreign terrorist fighters.”¹ The group has capitalized on local insurgencies and aligned with terrorist groups in as many 18 countries.² Beyond ISIL, terrorist groups like al-Qaida, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram remain active, low-cost terrorism, often aimed at soft targets and involving lone-actors, is becoming more prevalent, and right-wing violent extremism is on the rise in parts of Europe and North America.

Some of the most important lessons of this period are that military and security-focused operations in isolation do not end terrorist movements and that governments cannot prevent radicalization and recruitment to terrorism or build community resilience to violent extremism on their own. Rather, an appropriate balance between kinetic and non-kinetic tools, the inclusion of governments, civil society, and the private sector, and the protection of citizens’ basic rights and freedoms is necessary.

Over the years, policymakers, security officials, and donors have increasingly recognized the need to address the roots rather than the symptoms of violent extremism. Calls for a “whole of society” approach to address this threat have grown, with an increasingly diverse set of governmental and non-governmental, national and local, and security and non-security focused stakeholders involved in implementing the preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) agenda in its different regional, national, and local variations.

This report builds on the Prevention Project’s December 2016 report, “Communities First: A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement against Violent Extremism,” and is informed by a series of consultations with scores of governmental and non-governmental P/CVE stakeholders over the past 18 months. It takes stock of the progress and challenges in advancing the “whole of society” P/CVE agenda, which picked up considerable political momentum in 2015, and concludes with a series of practical, policy-relevant recommendations for enhancing its impact.

Among the areas of progress highlighted are:

- The UN’s expanded normative and programmatic role in this area, which, inter alia, has contributed to a steady increase in the number of countries developing P/CVE national action plans, though these vary in quality, structure, and objectives.
- Increasingly contextualized and conflict-sensitive research on drivers of violent extremism.
- Growing awareness among policymakers, practitioners, and experts that locally-rooted actors, such as civil society organizations (CSOs), can have comparative advantages when it comes to P/CVE.
- A growing number of P/CVE initiatives, particularly those led by CSOs and other local actors.
- An emergence of new P/CVE networks and other platforms for collaboration and cooperation within and among different segments of the expanding community of P/CVE stakeholders, again with an emphasis on civil society and other local actors.

---

A deepening involvement of development institutions in a field they had previously been cautious of engaging in.

- Increasing momentum behind the development of a community of practice to allow for the sharing of lessons learned and information among P/CVE stakeholders.

- A rise in multi-agency and multi-disciplinary intervention-focused collaborations around P/CVE.

- Increasing levels of donor funding for P/CVE initiatives, although the full funding picture is still unclear.

Barriers still remain to durable progress, however, which are explored in the report. These begin with the ambiguity around terminology, which include definitional and scope issues concerning violent extremism vs. terrorism, preventing vs. countering violent extremism (CVE), and violent extremism vs. non-violent extremism. This ambiguity limits a shared understanding among P/CVE stakeholders of how violent extremism operates and what P/CVE programming is trying to achieve.

Other barriers addressed include:

- The challenge of aligning the framing of the global, “whole-of-society” P/CVE agenda with the priorities and concerns of the CSOs and other local actors, which are critical to sustaining it.

- Striking the appropriate balance between national leadership and local action. Many national authorities are still reluctant to cede control or resources over what they perceive to be national security concerns. This is further compounded by the shrinking space for civil society to contribute to P/CVE efforts.

- Coordination among donors appears to be the exception rather than the rule. This includes the tendency to make funding decisions with little regard to what other donors might be funding in the same geographic or thematic area.

- P/CVE policies and programs are too often dictated by political and other considerations, including a preference for short-term measures or an aversion to risk, or informed by assumptions rather than evidence. This has contributed to undue attention on counter-narrative interventions and an underemphasis on governance- and human rights-related P/CVE programs.

- Significant gaps in understanding and sharing lessons learned about “what works—and what doesn’t” to build resilience against violent extremism.

The report, which is informed by ongoing research focused on evaluating P/CVE intervention approaches conducted by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), focuses particular attention on addressing this last barrier, which has led to a reliance on assumption-based programmatic logics.

The report concludes that understanding the current ‘state-of-play’ in the P/CVE space, including a critical appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses and the comparative advantages of the various stakeholders, is necessary for developing practical guidance that can consolidate progress to-date and overcome some of the barriers to enable durable success going forward. With this objective in mind, the Prevention Project and RUSI developed a series of policy-relevant recommendations that include actionable ideas across five interrelated areas:

- Strengthening locally-led P/CVE efforts;

- Enhancing the contribution of CSOs to P/CVE;

- Strengthening cooperation and collaboration among national and sub-national authorities and other stakeholders relevant to P/CVE;

- Enhancing the P/CVE contributions of development institutions, including the OECD, the World Bank, and other development assistance providers; and

- Improving the evidence base for and monitoring and evaluation of P/CVE efforts.
INTRODUCTION

Seventeen years after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the international community is facing terrorist and violent extremist threats that are more so than ever globally connected and locally rooted. This is despite the trillions of dollars invested in military operations and other security-focused counterterrorism measures. The latest Global Terrorism Index reported that terrorism is affecting an unprecedented number of states while over 110 countries have seen their citizens travel to conflict zones in recent years to support terrorist groups. Despite its military setbacks and loss of territory in Iraq and Syria, the ISIL has continued to spread its violent extremist ideology and stretch its operational reach by capitalizing on local insurgencies and aligning with terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Philippines, Libya, and West Africa. This has been compounded by local organizations proactively coopting or aligning with the ISIL brand to benefit from indirect financial flows and symbolic capital. High-impact, low-cost terrorism, often aimed at soft targets, is also on the rise; lone-wolf attacks are becoming more prevalent, and right-wing violent extremism has been increasing in Europe and North America, with groups strategizing beyond national borders on how to secure and advance their interests.

Some of the most important lessons of this period are that military operations, in isolation, do not end terrorist movements and that governments cannot prevent radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations or build community resilience to violent extremism on their own. Rather, the most effective strategy for fighting terrorism and violent extremism—one that avoids backlash, backsliding, and other unintended consequences—involves an appropriate balance between kinetic and non-kinetic tools; the inclusion of governments, civil society, and the private sector; and, perhaps most fundamentally, the protection of citizens’ basic rights and freedoms.

A growing consensus has emerged regarding the need to address—and invest more resources in addressing—the underlying conditions that can give rise to terrorism and violent extremism in the first place. These include governance challenges such as the alienation

---

3 According to one estimate, the United States alone has spent an estimated $2.8 trillion on counterterrorism since September 2001, the vast majority on military and other security-focused measures. “Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America while Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability,” Stimson Center, May 2018, https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-while-promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability.


and marginalization of many people around the globe, and issues of inequality, particularly in relation to gender, which have contributed to attacks in places as diverse as Belgium, France, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, and Tunisia.

Addressing the political, social, and economic factors conducive to violent extremism is enshrined as one of the four pillars of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. However, the emergence of ISIL and the congruent rise in the number of young men and women joining the terrorist group and its transnational affiliates; the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE); and the release of the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (UN PVE Plan of Action), together substantially heightened the attention P/CVE received from policymakers, security officials, and donors, and brought it to the forefront of the international peace, security, and development agenda.

Of course, neither the White House Summit nor the UN PVE Plan of Action invented the concept of a “whole-of-society” approach to addressing violent extremism; this approach had already been embraced by the European Union (EU), among others. However, both, as well as the priority that multilateral fora such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and Organization for Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) attached to P/CVE, helped draw high-level political attention around the globe to the need for a more strategic, inclusive, and preventive approach to the challenge—one that extends beyond national governments and security actors and recognizes that local authorities, communities, and civil society are critical partners in identifying and addressing underlying


15 While its conceptual parameters are contested and unpacked further in this report, P/CVE is a broad umbrella term to categorize activities implemented by governmental and non-governmental actors seeking to prevent or mitigate violent extremism through non-coercive measures that are united by the objective of addressing the drivers of violent extremism. Development organizations and practitioners, in particular, have individual preferences for applying the terms ‘preventing violent extremism’ or ‘countering violent extremism’. However, there is often little difference in the specific objectives and actions on the ground between the two. “EU Operational Guidelines on the Preparation and Implementation of EU financed actions specific to countering terrorism and violent extremism in third countries,” RUSI and CIVPOL (commissioned by the European Commission), November 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ct CVE_guidelines.pdf. P/CVE is widely understood to include, for instance, community debates on sensitive topics, media messaging, inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues, training of state governance and security actors, and a variety of initiatives with individuals deemed to be ‘at risk’ of joining or being attracted to violent extremist groups, such as vocational training and mentorship programs. As highlighted in the EU’s ‘Operational Guidance for CT and P/CVE,’ P/CVE therefore overlaps with efforts to prevent violence and conflict by supporting development, strengthening institutions, and strengthening appropriate policy frameworks. In practical terms, that means that P/CVE practitioners have struggled to draw clear boundaries between P/CVE programs with those of other, well-established fields, such as development and poverty alleviation, peacebuilding, governance, and education. In practical terms, that means that P/CVE practitioners have struggled to draw clear boundaries between P/CVE programs with those of other, well-established fields, such as development and poverty alleviation, peacebuilding, governance, and education. They are designed to counter the critical factors of violent extremism in the specific locations in which they occur; addressing relevant social networks, radical mentors, revenge seeking, the pursuit of status and a host of other motivating, enabling, and structural factors. Such efforts generally aim to target individuals specifically identified as ‘at risk of’; or ‘vulnerable’ to being drawn to violence to the extent feasible in any given location. James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, “Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation,” Whitehall Report, RUSI, 8 June 2016, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_r_combinedonline4.pdf.


18 Local authorities include organizations that are officially responsible for all the public services and facilities in a particular area as well as communal or other leadership that is not formally recognized as part of the state (e.g., community-led courts).
drivers of violent extremism. Although there have been setbacks, these efforts have helped catalyze a significant growth in P/CVE activities at the global, regional, national, and sub-national levels, with an increasingly diverse set of stakeholders and expertise becoming involved. These include: youth-focused, women-led, faith-based, and other CSOs; mental health and social service providers; parents; researchers; teachers; business and religious leaders; mayors, governors and other sub-national officials and practitioners, including local police; peacebuilders and traditional development actors; corrections and probation officers; and ministries of education, social welfare, and health.
A Roadmap to Progress | 7

THE PREVENTION PROJECT

The Prevention Project was launched in March 2016 to gather from, develop with, and disseminate practical guidance to this ever-expanding group of P/CVE stakeholders on how to enhance the effectiveness and help sustain a “whole of society” approach to P/CVE. Its December 2016 report, “Communities First”, informed by consultations with an array of government and non-governmental partners, took stock of the then nascent—and seemingly fragile—global P/CVE movement and offered policy-relevant recommendations aimed at sustaining it. The report addressed issues such as the need to 1) enhance donor resource mobilization and enable more strategic donor engagement; 2) balance P/CVE and traditional counterterrorism objectives; 3) advance more locally-led P/CVE approaches; 4) empower civil society and local authorities; and 5) make the international architecture fit for P/CVE purposes.19

One of that report’s conclusions, one that remains valid today, is that the rhetoric around the importance of a “whole-of-society” approach to violent extremism is too often at odds with reality, exemplified by the many trends that continue to negatively affect civil society- and other locally-led programming and advocacy around P/CVE. The tepid, heavily caveated language around the role of civil society in the UN General Assembly’s most recent resolution20 renewing the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and civil society’s exclusion21 from half of the UN Secretary-General’s high-level conference on counterterrorism in June 2018, an event specifically focused on developing new partnerships, are just two of many examples. As one expert explained, “the Resolution fail[ed] to sincerely reinforce the importance of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, by formalizing engagement outside of the security and public sectors, to effectively, credibly, and sustainably prevent violent extremism and counter terrorism.”22

Since the release of “Communities First,” the Prevention Project has continued to engage with a wide range of partners, including governments (both national and local), multilateral organizations, and a diverse group of civil society actors around the globe to promote locally-led, “whole-of-society” approaches to addressing the threat of violent extremism. The focus has been on tracking the progress in advancing the P/CVE agenda (including by advocating for the implementation of relevant recommendations outlined in “Communities First”),23 with emphasis on the role of CSOs, municipal authorities and other local actors, and the additional steps that national and global actors should be taking to enable more locally-led efforts. This focus remains driven by the changing nature of the threat, an increased understanding of what motivates individuals to join violent extremist groups, and on the acknowledgement that in some areas, local stakeholders are better-placed to prevent and counter violent extremism than their national or global counterparts.

---

22 Eelco Kessels, Executive Director, Global Center on Cooperative Security, Remarks at High-Level Conference of Head of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States, 29 June 2018 (copy on file with authors).
The Prevention Project, including in its capacity as co-leader of the Global Solutions Exchange (GSX), has consulted with hundreds of different P/CVE stakeholders over the past 18 months. It has organized workshops and roundtables focused on a range of P/CVE topics to better understand how the agenda has progressed since December 2016 and the barriers to further progress. This report and its recommendations are informed by these consultations. In addition, the report has also been informed by findings from the RUSI-led contribution to the Prevention Project. Building on data collected on P/CVE interventions from 2016-2017, RUSI is currently working on a meta-level evaluation of P/CVE initiatives to help gain a richer understanding of “what works and what does not” in the P/CVE space. To this end, RUSI is interrogating the validity of underlying theories of change and tackling the (often flawed) assumptions underlying some P/CVE interventions, to improve the evidence-base for P/CVE best practice (See Appendix 2).

24 The Global Solutions Exchange (GSX) is a global civil society advocacy, policy analysis, and collaboration platform dedicated to P/CVE and supporting the implementation of relevant global frameworks at the regional, national, and local levels. The GSX was launched in September 2016 by the Royal Norwegian government in partnership with the International Civil Society Action Network and the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership, which it spearheads. Its overarching purpose is to enable more systematic engagement between CSOs and governments and multilateral bodies, and to share knowledge, perspectives, and solutions in promoting a “whole of society” gender-sensitive approach to P/CVE policies and practices. It also aims to promote greater collaboration among independent CSOs at the local, national, regional, and global levels to prevent and counter violent extremism and promote peace, rights, equality, and pluralism as necessary elements to counter the spread of violent extremism. The GSX is committed to providing policymakers with concrete, practical recommendations to enable them to develop and implement sustainable “whole of society” approaches to reducing radicalization and recruitment to violence. For more information on the GSX see http://www.gsxpve.org.
The Expanding UN Influence

Despite concerns from some member states, the UN PVE Plan of Action—and its calls for a “whole-of-society approach” to the challenge of violent extremism—continues to have normative influence, with the number of regional, national, and local P/CVE action plans inspired by the UN document growing. More than 30 plans, some stand-alone and others linked to a wider counterterrorism strategy, are now in place. International assistance, including via the Hedayah Global Center on Cooperative Security National Action Plan Task Force, which includes the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Commonwealth Secretariat as partners, is being made increasingly available to those interested in developing new or refining existing plans.

P/CVE NAPs, however, vary in quality, structure, objectives, participating actors, and their alignment with other national priorities. NAP advocates consider them vital frameworks to effectively address the challenge of violent extremism within communities, moving away from previous one-size-fits-all, security sector–led approaches to this complex and evolving challenge. Yet, the pace with which these plans are being developed and formally adopted by countries has prompted critiques as to how meaningful and inclusive national strategic policy planning processes and documents really are. In some countries, NAPs have relied on template approaches, replicating models designed elsewhere that do not necessarily align with the nuances of their specific country context or the actual causative factors of violent extremism domestically. In others, the strategies hold little practical value beyond fulfilling donor requests and are unlikely to be implemented. There is also the risk that governments can misuse NAPs to suppress political opposition by labeling it as “extremism.” For this and other reasons, it is important to focus, including in NAPs, on countering or preventing violent extremism rather than non-violent forms of extremism.

Growing Number of P/CVE Actors, Initiatives, and Networks

As a complement to its increasingly influential normative role, the UN’s P/CVE policy and programmatic

---


26 The P/CVE contributions of regional organizations also continue to expand, with the work of the OSCE, particularly in promoting the role and building the capacity of civil society and other community-level actors around P/CVE in the Western Balkans, offering an excellent example. See, e.g., “OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism,” OSCE, https://www.osce.org/unitedCVE.


30 Ibid.


32 Ibid.


34 Authors contributing to this report have worked on a number of different NAPs globally and have consulted widely with countries producing NAPs, and have identified this as a challenge.

work is expanding. UN Secretary-General António Guterres chairs a High-Level Action Group on PVE. The P/CVE work of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNESCO’s P/CVE work focuses on (i) education, skills development, and employment facilitation; (ii) empowerment of youth; (iii) strategic communications, the internet, and social media; and (iv) gender equality and empowering women, https://en.unesco.org/preventing-violent-extremism.

37 United Nations’ Women’s P/CVE work focuses on building, including through context-specific research, an understanding of women’s diverse roles in violent extremism, including as promoters or preventers, and working with women at the community level to support their empowerment as a key strategy for building social cohesion. http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2018/02/pve-brochure.

38 In addition to its work providing corrections officers training on the implementation of good practices for P/CVE in prisons, UNICRI is supporting P/CVE efforts of civil society actors, including NGOs, victims of terrorism, media, cultural associations, women, and youth organizations, in the Sahel and Maghreb. http://unicri.it/topics/counter-terrorism/.


Further, the new UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)—resulting from the much-heralded reform of the UN’s counterterrorism architecture—has similarly made P/CVE an integral part of its mandate. For example, together with UNDP and UNESCO, UNOCT chairs a UN inter-agency P/CVE working group that includes 22 UN entities and more than two-thirds of the projects supported by UNOCT funds are focused on P/CVE. Further, 15 UN entities, are implementing more than 260 P/CVE projects in 84 countries, with UNDP the most active UN agency in this space. This spike in support for P/CVE projects extends well beyond the UN, with one mapping exercise identifying nearly 1,400 programs from open-source data alone. (A growing number is focused on supporting youth-, women-, or other civil society-led initiatives in some 100 countries). CSOs are now involved in the design, development, and implementation of diverse initiatives across the full-spectrum of P/CVE issues: from prevention to intervention with individuals on the path to becoming radicalized violence to rehabilitation and reintegration, both on- and off-line. These initiatives are both focused at the community and individual levels, and in partnership with and independent from governments. A selection of innovative locally-led P/CVE initiatives is featured in the first appendix to this report.
Box 1. Examples of P/CVE Networks Involving Civil Society Organizations or Other Local Actors

- Through its nine working groups, the EU’s ‘Radicalization Awareness Network’ (RAN), which officially launched in 9 September 2011, connects first-line practitioners, field experts, social workers, teachers, civil society organizations (CSOs), victims’ groups, local authorities, law enforcement, academics, and others to gather and share best practices in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). RAN recently launched the Civil Society Empowerment Program (CSEP), which provides networking (including with social media companies), capacity building, and funding opportunities for CSOs around the world, with a particular focus on developing counter-narrative campaigns and other online-focused P/CVE programs. The EU CSEP database includes more than 400 CSOs.a

- The Strong Cities Network (SCN) was launched in 2015 to facilitate the systematic sharing of knowledge, expertise, and lessons learned on building social cohesion and community resilience to prevent violent extremism among cities and other sub-national authorities across different regions. It now includes more than 120 international members.b

- The Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN) was initiated in 2015 and now connects over 1,300 young people and organizations across more than 130 countries with the goal of strengthening local, youth-led P/CVE efforts around the globe.c

- Initiated in 2015, the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL) connects women’s rights and peace practitioners, organizations, and networks engaged in P/CVE and the promotion of peace, rights, and pluralism. The WASL currently integrates more than 90 organizations and individuals from nearly 30 countries.d

- Founded in 2016, the Southeast Asia Network of Civil Society Organizations on Countering Violent Extremism (SEA-CSO) supports the capacity building of Southeast Asian CSOs working to prevent violent extremism.e

- Launched in 2016, Families Against Terrorism and Extremism brings together 42 CSOs across eight countries in Europe and North Africa, as well as families of individuals recruited into terrorist groups or victims of terrorist attacks. It focuses on what families across Europe and North Africa can do to help prevent and counter violent extremism.f

- Launched in 2017, the Observatory for the Prevention of Extremist Violence (OPEV) is a P/CVE platform of more than 100 CSOs from across the Euro-Mediterranean Region. The OPEV coordinates efforts to implement the 2017 Plan of Action of Euro-Mediterranean civil society to prevent all forms of violent extremism.g

- The East Africa Civil Society Organizations Hub for P/CVE was launched in 2017 as an independent network of CSOs and civil society leaders engaged in P/CVE across East Africa. It aims to support and deepen regional civil society networks, strengthen programming capacities, and develop a broadly representative voice for civil society to efficiently engage with governments and
Box 1. Examples of P/CVE Networks Involving Civil Society Organizations or Other Local Actors (continued)

- The Sahel Network on Preventing Violent Extremism was launched in 2018 to strengthen the capacities and structures of civil society to efficiently prevent violent extremism and ensure sustainable peace in the Sahel region. It includes more than 25 member-CSOs across seven countries and is focused on three P/CVE issues: the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremism offenders and victims, strengthening the justice system, and community engagement.

- Efforts are underway to create a Western Balkans civil society hub to prevent and counter violent extremism that will empower CSOs in the region, including women-, youth- and faith-based organizations, to be more effective and accountable actors and to improve their capacity to implement projects and dialogue with governments, to influence policy and decision-making processes as it relates to P/CVE in the Western Balkans.


Increasing Contextualized Research on Drivers

The increase in programmatic support for P/CVE initiatives—particularly locally-led ones—is linked, in part, to two factors.

Firstly, there is growing awareness among policymakers, practitioners, and experts that locally-rooted actors, particularly CSOs, can have comparative advantages when it comes to P/CVE. These may include: a) trust, credibility, and access within communities susceptible to violent extremist recruitment in ways that national and multilateral institutions do not; b) knowledge of evolving local trends and dynamics or contributory factors feeding violent extremism; c) strong expertise and experience in both identifying and addressing relevant drivers; d) the ability to be more innovative and flexible than governments in diagnosing and addressing emerging issues; e) providing space for productive engagement between their governments and local communities, and f) supporting communities with the reintegration of returning or relocating foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).

Civil society organizations are of course not without their limitations, however—many have weak or ineffective administrative capacities, insecure or conditional funding streams, and risk reinforcing the tensions framing wider societal relations in the contexts they are operating. While high-functioning organizations can respond to fluid dynamics on the ground, some invariably remain inflexible and bereft of sufficient resources to react to new variables, or rely on programmatic modalities designed without any preliminary research. Many simply re-brand pre-existing development projects as P/CVE to entice donor funding irrespective of relevance or need. Crucially, the

reach of CSOs also tends to be exaggerated: in Kenya and Tanzania for example, research suggests that some “civil society members” were not considered as influencers by “at-risk” groups, and therefore not credible interlocutors, alluding to a “crisis of confidence” and a lack of trust between organizations and local communities. These findings are obviously not universal as preferences change according to the specificities of particular societal milieus, but it is clear there are problematic assumptions associated with civil society stakeholders, including that CSOs necessarily have the most credibility with local communities. This is largely because civil society is a vast conceptual umbrella populated by an eclectic range of entities with different dispositions, motivations, capabilities, agendas, and experiences. Outfits with greater access to vulnerable individuals are not always politically palatable or align with Western (donor) norms, values, or sensibilities, presenting further complications that potentially require negotiation. Navigating this space remains challenging and it is incumbent on policy-makers, practitioners, and donors to not only interrogate context but to map and rigorously analyze prospective stakeholders in any intervention site.

The second factor is the proliferation of contextualized, conflict-sensitive research on factors contributing to violent extremism. More evidence is available on what fuels radicalization and recruitment, such as underlying governance deficits in places like Indonesia, Iraq, and Kosovo; feelings of economic exclusion in Tunisia; real or perceived state abuse (such as human rights violations) across the Sahel; historic conflicts; and marginalization and injustice from Afghanistan to Somalia. The proliferation of available research has also helped debunk certain stereotypes regarding the role of young people, religious actors, and women in P/CVE, generating heightened awareness of how these stakeholders need to be engaged, empowered, and listened to across all aspects of P/CVE policy-making and program design.

Deepening Involvement of Development Institutions

The growing body of contextualized research has also helped demonstrate how development issues, such as inequality before the law, economic and political exclusion and marginalization, governance and trust deficits, corruption, and uneven resource allocation and service provision can lead to rising levels of violent


extremism. This is contributing to greater awareness of the linkages between security and development and how violent extremism can undermine progress on development.

International and national development agencies, as well as peacebuilding and other non-governmental development actors, are therefore considering how development tools and resources can be applied to prevent violent extremism. The emerging response of development actors to violent extremism is based on the assumption that addressing both the manifestations of violent extremism and the conditions conducive to violent extremism is a development challenge. It will require strengthening the fundamental building blocks of equitable development, human rights, governance, and the rule of law.

Recent efforts of three actors of the international development architecture—the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNDP, and the World Bank—illustrate the fundamental shift that has taken place over the past few years among development institutions when it comes to P/CVE, a shift that will be difficult to reverse.

**OECD**

As a result of the 2016 update to the OECD’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) guidelines, the 35 OECD member states can report funding for PVE activities—including education, rule of law, working with civil society to prevent radicalization, some security and justice systems capacity building, and research into positive alternatives to violent extremism—as part of their annual development target. Although it is difficult to quantify the precise amounts, this change has allowed for additional development assistance to be used to address the drivers of violent extremism. However, there is more the OECD could be doing to influence the direction and quality of PVE programming. This includes providing an ODA code for PVE and facilitating information sharing and other coordination among the expanding community of PVE development practitioners.

**UNDP**

Up until a few years ago, the UNDP would have resisted any public links to tackling terrorism or violent extremism. Today, however, the agency has an ambitious $100 million global PVE program; a PVE global program coordinator; PVE projects (including ones focused on building national capacity and coordination around PVE, training and engagement with religious leaders, youth-focused job creation, rehabilitation and reintegration of former violent extremists, and research on what does and does not work in more than 45 countries); and an administrator, Achim Steiner, who is an unabashed champion of UNDP’s involvement in PVE. Mr. Steiner opened UNDP’s Second Global Meeting on Preventing Violent Extremism in May 2018, with the objective to “build on [PVE] successes and lessons learned, enhance partnerships and scale up [emphasis added] our [PVE] efforts.”

Through its research, the UNDP is improving the international community’s understanding of what

---


motivates young people to join and leave violent extremist groups. It is engaging with national governments on the importance of developing holistic, multidisciplinary, and inclusive strategies for preventing violent extremism that elevate the need to identify and address real and perceived grievances—as opposed to symptoms of violent extremism—and is directing more of its expertise and resources to allow governments and civil society to collaboratively contribute to the implementation of such strategies.

However, questions have been raised as to whether UNDP and other development actors are simply repackaging traditional development work as PVE to attract more funding from increasingly constrained donors. In practical terms, this has led to a distinction between “preventing violent extremism” and “countering violent extremism”. While initially there was little difference between the two in terms of objectives and actions on the ground, over time—particularly following UNDP’s engagement in the field—these labels have developed practical implications. CVE activities are now perceived by some development actors to be closer to counterterrorism in contrast to PVE, which is seen as “upstream” longer-term work designed to address the structural factors of violent extremism. This creates further ambiguities, which complicates efforts to monitor and evaluate the field. Meanwhile, some prevention work currently implemented risks being too far from the problem itself, which is to impact on violent extremism.

**WORLD BANK**

Much like the UNDP, the World Bank had to react to demands for help in addressing violent extremism from national and sub-national governments by increasing its engagement in afflicted areas, including in Central Asia, the Western Balkans, East and West Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. Last spring, the Bank organized its first internal PVE workshop, inviting representatives from its country offices and practice groups for a frank conversation about the Bank’s work in violent extremism-affected or -threatened spaces to enhance its engagement with the PVE agenda.

Although the Bank has so far moved in a more cautious and insular (i.e., with limited engagement with non-Bank stakeholders) manner than the UNDP when it comes to PVE, it has many comparative advantages in this space. These include: 1) data collection and analysis to help countries understand the factors of radicalization to violent extremism and the community dynamics that support or protect against it; 2) its position as a center of knowledge-sharing on violence and conflict, and provider of technical assistance; and 3) its reputation as an “honest broker” to facilitate policy dialogues with governments regarding the drivers of violent extremism, and “to encourage governments to tackle structural challenges such as political exclusion, regional imbalances, or youth integration.”

A shift in the thinking at the Bank and the UN was evident in the 2017 joint UN-World Bank report, “Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches on Preventing Violent Conflict.” The report reflects an increased awareness that contributing factors of violent conflict and, more narrowly, violent extremism, are rooted in deeper societal and structural issues linked to exclusion may lead the Bank and other development agencies to rethink its approach in certain countries. If development institutions are now going to prioritize

the prevention of violent conflict (including violent extremism), then we might see them allocate more resources to those communities most susceptible to radicalization and recruitment, and focus on building resilience and social cohesion with and within them. If acted upon, the findings in this World Bank-U.N. report could lead to additional development funds being directed to those segments of the population where feelings of marginalization and exclusion are strongest, rather than exclusively to those that are poorest.60

Emerging Community of P/CVE Practice

Growing involvement from the development sector in P/CVE has led to a number of benefits, including the emergence of a community of practice—albeit still informal—to better inform P/CVE programming design and implementation. Significantly, there has been increased attention on, and expanded tools for, measuring the effectiveness of P/CVE interventions in a field that “has been criticized for not sufficiently testing assumptions with systematic and empirically based research.”61 There is now an ever-expanding library of toolkits and other guides for policymakers and practitioners to draw on to improve the design and M&E—and thus the overall impact—of P/CVE interventions. For example, in August 2018, Hedayah and RUSI launched MASAR, a monitoring, measurement and evaluation desktop and smartphone app to help practitioners, particularly CSOs, develop robust metrics to assess the effectiveness of their P/CVE programs.62

Growth in Multi-disciplinary and Multi-Agency Collaborations for P/CVE Interventions

Another area of P/CVE progress is the growing emphasis on multi-disciplinary and multi-agency collaborations, networks, and initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism (see Box 2). These efforts generally involve representatives from a plurality of municipal agencies and local organizations—education, health, social welfare, youth, and, if suitable, police and corrections—meeting on a regular basis for the identification, development, and delivery of interventions to benefit individuals and their families referred to the unit by a concerned member of the community. These platforms offer the sharing of information among experts from different disciplines as they aim to identify the individuals most vulnerable to, or at the early stages of, engaging with extremist violence, and steer them down a different, non-violent path.

These “hubs” or “tables” as they are sometimes labelled have become increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level in Australia63 and Canada,64 as well as across the EU. The EU’s Radicalization Awareness Network included examples of this practice in its

60 Ibid.
Although the UK’s Channel program and Denmark’s Aarhus Program are perhaps the most-well known examples of these programs, they are becoming an increasingly popular tool for preventing and countering violent extremism as well as other forms of violence. Examples include:

- **Community Connect** in Boston, Massachusetts is a community-based program run out of a local children’s hospital. It grew out of an existing partnership between researchers and the Somali refugee community and focuses on addressing the concerns of the community, which include violent extremism. It seeks to reduce stigma, promote engagement and strengthened sense of belonging in the community and social connections with other communities and the government. It includes mental health providers, community leaders, religious leaders, and educators, who provide the necessary services after an assessment of the individual’s needs. The program also focuses on monitoring the different interventions and increasing the capacity of the service providers to support the community. Law enforcement is not at the table and the program does not receive referrals from the police; however, the program can share information, following agreed protocols, with the police where there is an imminent security threat. It does not receive U.S. federal government funding but relies on financial support from state and non-governmental sources.

---

**Box 2. Multi-Disciplinary Hubs/Referral Mechanisms and Local Prevention Networks for P/CVE**

Although the UK’s Channel program and Denmark’s Aarhus Program are perhaps the most-well known examples of these programs, they are becoming an increasingly popular tool for preventing and countering violent extremism as well as other forms of violence. Examples include:

- **Community Connect** in Boston, Massachusetts is a community-based program run out of a local children’s hospital. It grew out of an existing partnership between researchers and the Somali refugee community and focuses on addressing the concerns of the community, which include violent extremism. It seeks to reduce stigma, promote engagement and strengthened sense of belonging in the community and social connections with other communities and the government. It includes mental health providers, community leaders, religious leaders, and educators, who provide the necessary services after an assessment of the individual’s needs. The program also focuses on monitoring the different interventions and increasing the capacity of the service providers to support the community. Law enforcement is not at the table and the program does not receive referrals from the police; however, the program can share information, following agreed protocols, with the police where there is an imminent security threat. It does not receive U.S. federal government funding but relies on financial support from state and non-governmental sources.

---


---

**65** “Collection of Practices and Approaches to Preventing Radicalization to Terrorism and Violent Extremism.” They have also emerged in diverse contexts such as Kosovo, Lebanon, and Jordan, and efforts are underway to develop multi-agency intervention programs in Bangladesh and Macedonia, among other countries.

Rather than focusing purely on the potentially stigmatizing issue of violent extremism, the platforms are increasingly packaging the issue as one among a wider set of violence-related and safe-governing concerns to the relevant community. This approach, which may be more likely to gain traction among the non-law enforcement community than a P/CVE-only hub, relies on solid analysis to develop a clear understanding of the local context; a common understanding of risk; representation of varied backgrounds and skill sets, including, where appropriate, the local police; and the inclusion of a referral mechanism, assessment process, individualized support plan, and monitoring and evaluation.
**Box 2. Multi-Disciplinary Hubs/Referral Mechanisms and Local Prevention Networks for P/CVE (continued)**

- **Referral Mechanism for Preventing Violent Extremism, Gjilan, Kosovo.** Established in 2016, it is part of a municipal-led effort to prevent predominantly young people from traveling to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. The mechanism is administered by the mayor’s office and has 15 active members who come from different local institutions, including the police, education, social work, hospital, and religious affairs. Depending on the nature of the case, the mechanism receives referrals from members and families in the community and creates a group of two to three members to work with each case. The members of the mechanism cannot publicly speak about the cases or even discuss them with colleagues. According to those involved in managing the program, it has handled eight cases, with all individuals having successfully been steered away from becoming a violent extremist.\(^b\)

- **MERIT (Multiagency Early Risk Intervention Tables), Ottawa, Canada.** One of a number of local multi-agency “tables” in Canada, this is a community safety and well-being initiative supported by the Ottawa Police Service that aims to reduce risk and victimization and improve community resiliency and well-being. It brings the police and community agencies from the health, education, social, and safety services sectors together to provide targeted interventions to individuals, families, and areas that are experiencing acutely elevated levels of risk of harm. MERIT includes a P/CVE component, which seeks to raise “front-line awareness and community and civic capacity to intervene to reduce risk, victimization, and criminality associated with violent extremism.”\(^c\)

- **Engagement and Support Program** in New South Wales, Australia is one of various state-level, multi-agency P/CVE intervention programs in Australia. It is co-managed by the state-level police and justice departments, and involves representatives from state-level mental health, education, juvenile justice, family and community services, corrections agencies, as well as the Australian Federal Police. They come together to coordinate and oversee tailored support plans for individuals who have been referred to the panel. Among the priorities is to “create strong relationships to disengage participants from anti-social behaviors, vulnerabilities, and any uncertainties they may have with their own identity or beliefs.”\(^d\)

- **Local Prevention Networks** in the municipalities of Saida, Tripoli, and Majdal Anjar, Lebanon, and Irbid, al-Karak, and Zarqa, Jordan.\(^e\) Established in 2016 and 2017, respectively, these platforms include local practitioners such as teachers, youth workers, religious leaders, representatives from local and national government institutions, and psycho-social intervention providers. Law enforcement is not involved. The networks meet monthly to identify risk factors and behaviors in the relevant community and to coordinate local P/CVE efforts and responses to local issues related to violent extremism and implement local outreach activities, such as awareness sessions, for youth and families or roundtables for religious leaders on P/CVE and interfaith dialogue. The networks are led by the municipalities and many are eager to become institutionalized as ‘Prevention Committees’ with formal status in the municipal structure. The networks represent the first known

---


\(^d\) “Countering Violent Extremism In New South Wales,” Department of Premier and Cabinet, New South Wales, August 2018 (copy on file with authors).

\(^e\) These networks are supported with funding from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are part of a Strong Cities Network pilot project, https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/asc-lebanon-jordan-6-prevention-networks-established/.
There are too few opportunities for practitioners and policymakers from different regions to share lessons learned, both positive and negative, from such programs, which are not without their challenges. For example, it is hard to strike a balance between privacy and information sharing, particularly between non-law enforcement professionals and the police, or sustain the necessary level of coordination among an often disparate team. Frequently there are issues in trying to gain the trust of local communities, especially if recipients have previous negative experience with security actors. It is difficult to ensure participants in multi-agency teams have the necessary P/CVE expertise, and these hubs need to try incentivizing sustained engagement from the diversity of actors while avoiding “tokenistic” participation. Crucially, there are cultural and societal barriers to seeking mental health treatment that need to be overcome.\(^66\) The UK Channel program, currently in its third iteration, has faced many of these obstacles.\(^67\)

Nevertheless, the increased focus on these kinds of practical initiatives reflects a growing awareness that programs concentrated on early interventions targeting “at-risk”\(^68\) individuals can fill a critical gap that lies between broader-based P/CVE efforts around building social cohesion and resilience to violent extremism at the community level on the one-hand, and security-focused counterterrorism measures on the other. They are also proving effective at mobilizing and focusing “whole-of-society” efforts—including those activities by civil society and professionals from across a range of disciplines—in a targeted fashion, allowing a more erudite analysis of impact than broader-based P/CVE efforts.

In many cases, these initiatives, which should be linked to local P/CVE action plans where possible, are managed by municipal authorities and highlight the increased role that cities and other sub-national authorities are playing in P/CVE as policymakers and practitioners. This is part of another positive P/CVE trend over the past couple of years: local governments, albeit still too few, increasing their P/CVE engagement.\(^69\) This trend reflects a growing recognition that many of the core capacities necessary for effective prevention and reintegration of former violent extremists (such as education, social welfare, mental health, job training) rest with cities and communities. These stakeholders are better placed to understand grievances and the range of different factors making citizens vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization to extremist and other forms of violence due to their proximity to local populations.

### Rising Levels of P/CVE Funding

Another indicator of progress in advancing the global P/CVE agenda is the amount of funding being made available to support P/CVE programs. Particularly since the 2015 White House CVE Summit and the elaboration of the UN PVE Plan of Action that same

---


year, investment in P/CVE appears to have increased, with the EU as the largest P/CVE supporter both at home and abroad. At the end of 2017, P/CVE activities comprised more than half of the EU’s external assistance on counterterrorism (some €274 million), with P/CVE being among the strategic priorities in more than a half-dozen different EU regional and thematic funding instruments, reflecting its significance in EU programming.70 The U.S. Department of State fiscal year 2018 budget, which includes both State Department and USAID programs, attributes some $230 million to P/CVE, a significant increase from previous years.71 Other donors have also been increasingly active in the space, often using a mix of counterterrorism, security, and development assistance to fund a variety of global, regional, national, and local initiatives, including programs that engage civil society and other locally-rooted actors. They include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and the UK.

An important development over the past few years has been the prioritizing of support for local grassroots organizations and leaders on the frontline of efforts to address violent extremism. In this regard, donors are now more conscious of the need to look beyond those recipients with the most visibility and traditional power such as large international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other “usual suspects,” to smaller, community-based organizations and actors representing key sectors of the society or community. Examples include women, youth, religious, or ethnic minorities, who may be unable (for capacity or political reasons) or unwilling (for safety or reputational reasons) to engage with international donors directly. As a result, donors are increasingly more willing to put their resources in funding mechanisms that allow for sub-granting by larger organizations, including CSOs, which can quickly disburse and oversee (including handling often onerous donor reporting and monitoring requirements) small amounts of funding to smaller, grassroots actors (see Box 3).

Box 3. Small-Grants Mechanisms

- Multicultural New South Wales (Australia) runs the COMPACT program, providing small grants and capacity-building support to various community-based organizations working to build resilience and social cohesion against extremist hate, violence, and division.8
- The Global Center on Cooperative Security has so far provided small grants to more than 25 CSOs across Africa and Asia to support or develop and implement locally owned P/CVE initiatives.8
- Established in 2014, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund is the only multilateral P/CVE fund in the world and has mobilized more than $50 million from more than a dozen governmental donors and the EU. It has provided small grants to hundreds of grassroots organizations in Bangladesh, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, and Nigeria, with its funds having reached almost 900,000 people in its initial three target countries of Bangladesh, Mali, and Nigeria.2

---


c GCELERF website, https://www.gcerf.org/.


• **Hedayah** manages a €5,000,000 EU-funded program that provides grants between €40,000 and €100,000 to civil society actors in Central Asia and the Western Balkans.\(^d\)

• The International Civil Society Action Network, through its multi-donor mechanism, the **Innovative Peace Fund**, provides nearly 40 grants (averaging less than US $24,000 per award) to grassroots women-led organizations working at the intersection of P/CVE and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.\(^e\)

• The **Institute for Strategic Dialogue**, in collaboration with Google, is managing a £1,000,000 innovation fund\(^f\) that supports 22 CSO-led “innovative projects, online and offline, that seek to disrupt, undermine, counter, or provide positive alternatives to hate and extremism.”\(^g\) All the grant recipients are either new to the P/CVE space or undertaking new initiatives.

• The **International Organization for Migration** office in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be launching a USAID-funded small-grants program to support local, youth-focused P/CVE projects.

• **USAID**’s program, **Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism**, has provided grants (approximately US $50,000 each) and training to some 17 local CSOs in coastal Kenya to improve their operations and advocacy, making them better equipped to lead community-based P/CVE efforts.\(^h\)

• **Terre des hommes**, in partnership with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Center for Common Ground, and Bedër University (Albania), is managing an EU-funded small-grants (up to €10,000 per award) program\(^i\) in Albania to empower CSOs and community-based organizations working with young people and communities to develop P/CVE-related youth resilience activities.

• The **United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute** manages a £5,000,000 EU-funded program\(^j\) that provides grants to between 20 and 25 CSOs in the Sahel to support conflict mitigation and P/CVE efforts.

Although there is little doubt that the level of donor support for P/CVE efforts continues to increase, it remains difficult to quantify the overall level of funding for a variety of reasons. This includes the lack of a common definition of P/CVE among donors and the broader P/CVE community, as well as an inconsistent approach to the application of P/CVE labels to initiatives, given the political and other sensitivities surrounding the term. Funds for P/CVE initiatives in third countries are also typically drawn from counterterrorism or development budgets that generally do not have a specific line-item for P/CVE. Further, as highlighted in the following section, the challenges with donor coordination and a continued reluctance to invest in multi-donor projects may be limiting the overall impact of these investments.
THE CHALLENGES

The positive developments around the P/CVE agenda taking place at the global, regional, national, and local level, involving an array of stakeholders, are noteworthy. However, the current geopolitical environment is one of the many obstacles to achieving broader and more sustainable progress on an agenda that continues to be confronted with a growing number of skeptics.\(^{72}\) Perhaps most fundamentally, this starts with those governments that believe that terrorism will be defeated by military operations and repression (and not prevention) and that mostly ideology or religion is responsible for fueling terrorist recruitment. Certain governments prefer to emphasize religious or ideological reasons to ignore or obscure their own failures such as prevailing governance inadequacies (lack of service delivery, corruption, etc.), or rely on an overly aggressive security approach, which may be more responsible for violent extremism and the ability of these groups to recruit from the local population. Some governments are also suspicious of civil society actors engaging in the security realm, an area traditionally seen as the state’s remit, particularly as they often frame CSOs as vehicles for spreading or funding oppositional and extremist sentiments. These same regimes often view the global P/CVE agenda as a “pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states and destabilize legitimate governments.”\(^{73}\)

It is difficult to envisage a time when non-democratic regimes will support an agenda that involves acknowledging that how governments treat their citizens, particularly the most historically marginalized ones, matters when it comes to reducing levels of radicalization to violence. However, there exists a range of other less daunting challenges in the P/CVE arena that are standing in the way of enhancing the impact of P/CVE efforts and sustaining the “whole of society” approach to P/CVE over the long-term.

Ambiguity Around Terminology

Firstly, there are definitional and scope issues that continue to constrain the P/CVE space.\(^{74}\) This starts with a lack of clarity about the term “violent extremism.” No international definition exists and the UN has never even tried to agree on one nor distinguish between “terrorism” and “violent extremism.” There are also inconsistencies in terminology, creating confusion when stakeholders cycle among various CVE, PVE, and P/CVE labels when they may not have analogous definitions or interpretations. Within the UN system, for example, the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate only focuses on “CVE,” whereas UNOCT prefers “PVE.” These two entities share a similar understanding of the steps that should be taken to reduce the threat of violent extremism and both engage (often together\(^{75}\)) with government and non-governmental stakeholders on this agenda, but nevertheless use different terminology.

As noted earlier, development actors within the UN and beyond insist only on “PVE,” focusing their attention on applying development tools to the threat and at times shying away from conversations framed around “CVE,” due to lingering—and in some cases unfounded—concerns that the “C” is too closely associated with security-led approaches. To further complicate matters, the OSCE insists on “Preventing

---


and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism” (P/CVERLT) to make the link between violent extremism and terrorism explicit, something that the UN General Assembly appears to have also done by folding consideration of the UN PVE Plan of Action within its biennial review of the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

This goes beyond confusing semantics as a disjuncture between how programmes are discussed and understood may also create substantive implications for funding eligibility and donor preferences and can raise practical or political costs for project delivery. This has particularly detrimental implications for M&E. Analysis of P/CVE programming continues to be constrained by porous conceptual boundaries and a lack of coherence in the field, including, for example, whether interventions should prioritize behavioral or cognitive change, or both.77

P/CVE stakeholders can lack a shared understanding of how violent extremism operates and what preventive programming is trying to achieve.78 In terms of impact assessment, this ambiguity translates into problems of defining “success” and identifying “end target groups.” This has led to assumptions that could undermine the overall effectiveness of P/CVE. To demonstrate success, programs need to be rigorously designed and evaluated using relevant and observable indicators. Targeted programming that addresses a particular community’s needs and local factors leading to violence is likely to result in better programs.79 This model more aptly reflects the reality that radicalization is a non-linear process, requiring a holistic, contextually defined set of metrics to help assess both the relevance and effectiveness of preventive and corrective interventions.80

Mercy Corps, for example, looked into the links between youth economic opportunities, civil engagement, and conflict in Somaliland and Puntland. The research led to a series of counterintuitive findings, including that young people who felt they had more economic opportunities were at greater risk of engaging in and supporting political violence, although actual employment did not relate to an inclination towards political violence. The research also revealed that while out-of-school youth who receive skills training showed a lower propensity to engage in violence, they were also more likely to believe that violence is justified in some cases. Mercy Corps highlighted many skills-based training schemes risk raising expectations that are not easily met given the lack of economic opportunities.81

Gender equality programs are also increasingly popular activities for development organizations operating in the preventative space based on the assumption that progress on broader gender empowerment indicators can prevent radicalization to violence. For example, in Bangladesh, the government has implemented a program to support women’s economic, educational, and social empowerment. Indicators for success include women participating more in the economy, higher levels of education, and increased family planning. In Morocco, gender equality has similarly been identified as an avenue for tackling violent extremism.82

---

76 This reflects the emphasis the OSCE places on the protection of human rights when framing security issues as well as the need to find a formulation that will enable engagement in Central Asia.


Although correlations exist between gender inequalities and violent conflict, they are insufficient to prove the causative factors of violent extremism. This is not to say that in some contexts gender inequality might be a causative factor of violent extremism. But, more generally, “the impact of such efforts at female empowerment at countering violent extremism is more ambiguous.”

A review of the UK’s Prevent revealed that while women’s projects brought benefits such as improving access to services, education, and the arts, it did not inevitably translate into improving women’s response to terrorism. Meanwhile, it is also true that violent extremism emerges in peaceful, stable, and relatively equal societies.

Additionally, there is the preference of some governments (such as the UK and a growing number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, and the Gulf regions) and other stakeholders to focus on extremism without a direct link to violence. There are also lingering tendencies to emphasize a single (as opposed to all) form(s) of violent extremism. These divides, which show little signs of closing, are difficult to paper over in an international negotiation, reducing the likelihood of any concerted effort to try to resolve the above ambiguities.

It may be true, as one State Department official recently said, that “as soon as you stop talking about terminology and start talking about the nature and substance of the response, people are on the same page.” However, the lack of legal (and policy) clarity has, in the views of many of those who have criticized P/CVE efforts to date, including some UN Special Rapporteurs, “opened the door to abuse by some governments, with some legislating often broad definitions of ‘extremism,’ which have allowed for the suppression of legitimate political dissent, criminalization of speech and thought, and the development of a state-sponsored Islam.”

**Misalignment Between the Global Framework and Local Context**

A second, and related, barrier to sustained progress in advancing the “whole-of-society” approach centers around the challenges of aligning the framing of the “global” “whole-of-society” P/CVE agenda more broadly with the priorities and concerns of the CSOs and other local actors that are critical to sustaining it. Among the lessons learned over the past few years are that many (but not all) efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism work best when they are led by local actors, such as municipalities, schools, and civil society since “they know the local context and what motivates some people to commit horrible acts.” Additionally, the willingness of these local actors to engage, let alone lead, in this space—and the depth of their involvement—is very much linked to how the issue is framed and what terminology is used.

Despite the plethora of P/CVE conferences, workshops, action plans, and programs and discussions about how to address the threat posed by violent extremism, the use of P/CVE or “violent extremism”...
terminology has proven to be counterproductive in certain local contexts, as it can negatively impact actual work on the ground.\textsuperscript{91} In certain circumstances, this language can alienate communities by giving the impression that there is something wrong or needs fixing and that the beneficiaries are a threat.\textsuperscript{92}

Therefore, more attention needs to be given to ensuring the policies and programs aimed at P/CVE at the local level are framed around issues, labels, and discourse that most likely resonate with relevant, grassroots civil society groups and communities. Any appreciation of local priorities and concerns requires governments to consult with and listen to local communities before elaborating policies and programs that involve them. Local CSOs are often best placed to identify local priorities and inform both national policymakers and international stakeholders of the dangers associated with the use of certain terminology.

Good practices in this regard include the consultative process in Canada that preceded the launch of its Center on Community Engagement and the Prevention of Violence, which is essentially a national P/CVE coordination center. Ottawa eschewed the “violent extremism” lexicon in favor of terms, such as “community engagement”, “violence prevention”, or “safeguarding,” that their surveys revealed would garner more local support.\textsuperscript{93}

Similarly, in Australia, the state governments of New South Wales and Victoria chose to distance themselves from “violent extremism” and “P/CVE” terminology when developing their community-level programs aimed at preventing violent extremism. This followed push-back from recipient communities that voiced concerns over “securitization” and “stigmatization,” and instead expressed a preference for terms such as “community engagement,” “social cohesion,” “safe-guarding,” and “resilience building.”\textsuperscript{94} They took the additional step to guard against the perception of a securitized approach to preventing violent extremism by having a non-security actor (the state-level ministry of multicultural affairs) lead the community-focused prevention effort, including by managing a grants program—with the funding not coming from a security budget—to support CSO and other community-led projects.\textsuperscript{95}

However, as previously elaborated, CSOs and other locally-rooted actors are not perfect, and are sometimes inhibited by significant technical, political, capacity, and financial issues, or programmatic suitability. Faith actors are one group that demonstrates these weaknesses, despite their popularity in policy and donor circles.

There is a tendency to rely on faith actors and institutions to help situate and deliver P/CVE interventions, leveraging religious dialogues and theological education as either a corrective measure or a mechanism for consolidating community resilience. This prioritizes the role of ideology and discourse in radicalization processes, identifying malign ideas as the primary vehicle precipitating violent extremism. In reality, evidence suggests cognitive conversion and indoctrination

\textsuperscript{91} The information sharing and other multi-stakeholder collaboration, involving both law enforcement and non-law enforcement professionals, and more broadly the involvement of the very local actors whose engagement and leadership is so critical to actually reducing the threat of violent extremism, can become harder to actualize if framed around national security, as opposed to local priorities, of which “violent extremism” may not be at the top of the list. This is particularly so in marginalized communities where there is a historic lack of trust between these communities and the government.


\textsuperscript{93} Eric Rosand, “When It Comes to CVE, the United States Stands to Learn a Lot from Others. Will It?,” Lawfare Blog, 10 September 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-it-comes-cve-united-states-stands-learn-lot-others-will-it.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.

can often be retrospective, occurring once individuals have subscribed to a terrorist organization. Disproportionate investment in ideological or religiously-oriented initiatives could overlook more important dynamics, or exacerbate structural and individual incentives driving recruitment.

Beyond the significant ethical problems associated with state-led cognitive arbitration and prescribing boundaries for “acceptable” ideas, trying to cultivate or empower specific theological preferences also has numerous practical constraints. The promotion of “moderation” across various contexts may at best precipitate a backlash, particularly as “official” doctrines are often normatively unattractive. State sponsorships of faith actors also risk de-legitimizing their activities in the eyes of local congregations and communities. Public funding could therefore disrupt or undermine effective P/CVE programming, necessitating careful consideration over how resources are allocated and how the relationship between government—at any level—and autonomous local stakeholders is managed.

On a practical level, there are concerns that some self-declared community gatekeepers may not be credible and can import independent agendas antithetical to P/CVE objectives. Conversely, even where they do have local legitimacy they may not have the necessary skills or capacity to deliver interventions. Findings from STRIVE Horn of Africa, for example, indicate a propensity for inter-generational gaps to disrupt engagement between local clergy and vulnerable youth groups. Despite packaging their grievances in a religious rubric, “at-risk” individuals are often concerned with socioeconomic and political problems, which are often beyond the knowledge and experience of communal authorities. As a result, many religious leaders lack the confidence to debate these issues or are not able to reach vulnerable populations. Social network analysis in Kenya and Tanzania similarly suggests faith and political actors, even if they are well respected in the community, are not necessarily the first outlet that individuals turn to with their frustrations. Instead, “at-risk” actors can rely on “people they can access immediately,” creating a disconnect between conventional “influencers” and prospective beneficiaries. Mapping and analysing prospective stakeholders and intervention partners—and sharing such information—is therefore an imperative for practitioners and donors alike. The challenges in balancing the national and local perspectives around the P/CVE agenda become particularly difficult in the context of the current push for countries to develop NAPs for P/CVE. National governments (and often national security actors) are spearheading the effort, with rarely more than tokenistic involvement of local stakeholders. This inevitably limits the ability to capture local threat perceptions and local P/CVE and related capacities.

98 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
Imbalances Between National and Local Action—Global-Local Integration

Imbalances between national and local P/CVE action continue. This despite the fact that national policy-makers and practitioners increasingly recognize that P/CVE efforts, however labelled, require the development and implementation of tailored and targeted interventions at an individual, community, or local level, for which the national government is not always best placed to deliver.

Increased attention has been given to the unique role that cities and states can play in P/CVE, often complementing the efforts at the national and community levels, particularly since the launch of the Strong Cities Network (SCN) in September 2015. Sub-national authorities can serve as a bridge between national governments and civil society actors, facilitating bottom-up and top-down information sharing around P/CVE issues, as has been the case in Germany. The development of, for example, sub-national action plans like the recently announced approach in Mombasa County (Kenya) can focus attention on local (as opposed to national) drivers and priorities, ensuring that potentially stigmatizing and often politically sensitive issues related to violent extremism are framed in a manner that resonates with local communities. Cities can play an important role in fostering belonging, strengthening trust in fellow citizens and institutions, and ensuring equality before the law—all key elements to preventing violent extremism from taking root in its communities. They can build social cohesion and resilience against violent extremism by creating more open physical spaces with universal access to reduce segregation, polarization, and perceptions of isolation and nonbelonging, and enable more safe spaces for people to discuss and exchange different viewpoints.

Despite these comparative advantages, national governments’ consultation with cities and other sub-national authorities in the development and implementation of NAPs is the exception rather than the rule, even when many of the traditional prevention capacities (such as health, education, social welfare) are concentrated at the sub-national level. More broadly, national authorities in too many jurisdictions remain reluctant to relinquish control or resources over what they perceive to be national security concerns, a sphere in which they have historically enjoyed exclusive control.

Mechanisms to facilitate greater involvement of sub-national authorities in P/CVE, such as elaborating a clear division of labor and facilitating sustained information sharing, including relevant research, and other cooperation between the different levels of the relevant actors within countries, are few and far between. This inhibits the local implementation of P/CVE good practice. Although much attention has been given to the need to pursue multi-stakeholder or multi-agency approaches to address violent extremism, the importance of and challenges to realizing effective national/sub-national (or vertical) cooperation in a country—a key ingredient for effective multi-stakeholder collaboration—has yet to receive the attention it deserves.

However, the recent trend towards decentralization in some countries (e.g., Indonesia, Jordan, and Tunisia), with the resulting shift away from a centralized...
approach to governance, may, if linked to P/CVE, create more opportunities for strengthening vertical cooperation around the P/CVE agenda, including by allowing more space for municipal authorities to develop and implement P/CVE projects linked to a national framework.

**Insufficient Coordination Among Donors**

A further obstacle to sustained P/CVE progress is that coordination among donors remains the exception rather than the rule. Part of the challenge relates to the seemingly ever-expanding size of the P/CVE stakeholder group. This is particularly so with the relatively rapid rise in the level of interest among development institutions and the resulting increase in the number of donors and practitioners relevant to a P/CVE field that now cuts across the development and security worlds.

The EU-led “Donor Community of Practice on Development and Preventing Violent Extremism,” which has provided opportunities for at least some of the development donors in the P/CVE community to update each other periodically on funding priorities, lessons learned, and challenges, is one bright spot. Unfortunately, it is focused almost exclusively on development actors (and a sub-set of them at that), as are informal donor coordination efforts at the country-level in places like Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia. These initiatives are being implemented in an ad hoc fashion, with few, if any, systems in place to capture and access data on the current P/CVE landscape in a country, region, or on a specific theme. Moreover, this information has not been linked to institutions such as the World Bank, the UNDP, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), or the OECD, creating opportunity costs as they could potentially offer an institutional home for these otherwise disparate efforts.

None of these coordination efforts have yet had an appreciable impact on one of the perennial challenges in the P/CVE space: the tendency of donors to make decisions on which research projects to support or initiatives to fund with little regard to what another donor might be funding in the same geographic or thematic area. Rather than relying on existing research to serve as the evidence-base for launching new programs, donors tend to insist on new research as an output of any funded project, irrespective of whether this analysis has already been produced or funded by a different donor, or even different agency within the same donor organization. While anchoring any prospective intervention with robust analysis and evidence is essential, and often requires program-specific research inquiries, broader mappings of ongoing or planned P/CVE initiatives—delineated either geographically or thematically—are rarely shared, creating opportunity costs and the risk of wasteful duplication. When mappings are undertaken, they are not generally updated on a regular basis to include new initiatives since the mapping was completed.

Moreover, even with nascent coordination, multi-donor projects that can help bring initiatives to scale remain the exception, with government donors preferring to fund initiatives that they have exclusive control over. In this context GCERF was established, in part to facilitate the pooling of funds from different donors to “provide a political and resource mobilization focal point for the international community” in select countries. However, it has struggled to attract resources from donors partially due to their reluctance to cede control, resulting in a preference for directing P/CVE resources to other outlets over which the individual donor can exert near exclusive control.

**Relying on Political and Other Considerations Rather than Being Informed by the Evidence**

P/CVE interventions also appear to be too often dictated by political and other considerations (including a preference for short-term measures and an aversion to risk) or assumptions, rather than informed by the evidence.

---

UNDER APPRECIATION OF THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND P/CVE

There is an ever-growing body of research, expanded on in part by organizations such as UNDP,\textsuperscript{110} International Alert,\textsuperscript{111} the International Republican Institute,\textsuperscript{112} and Mercy Corps,\textsuperscript{113} that draws attention to linkages between deficits in local governance and violent extremism in certain contexts. This includes studies on Indonesia, Jordan, Kosovo, Somalia, and Tunisia, as well as regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. More specifically, this analysis demonstrates how corruption, trust deficits between local authorities and their constituencies, insufficient responsiveness by local governments to the needs of its citizens, the lack of mechanisms to address local grievances, the lack of transparency in budgeting processes, and the lack of recreational infrastructure such as schools, parks, playgrounds, or other extracurricular options for vulnerable youth, can make communities more susceptible to recruitment and radicalization to extremist violence.

Despite the growing evidence-base and ever growing recognition of the role that municipalities and other local authorities can play in the P/CVE space, local governance has yet to receive the attention it deserves in P/CVE policy and programming conversations. There are manifold reasons for this attention deficit. These include the fact that local governance challenges can look fundamentally different across countries, which complicates program design. Additionally, there is the siloed nature of the different relevant fields and international actors involved, as well as a general reluctance of many international P/CVE stakeholders to prioritize long-term, hard-to-measure—and often complex and politically sensitive—structural issues. Instead they tend to prefer short-term, easier to measure engagements, at least at the output level, such as those focused on countering extremist narratives and propaganda, including by empowering individual youth, women, and religious leaders.

OVEREMPHASIZING COUNTER-NARRATIVES AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

P/CVE interventions appear to be too often defined by political and other considerations, leading to a preference for short-term, risk-averting measures, and based on assumptions rather than evidence. Counter-narratives and strategic communications are prominent examples, particularly given ISIL’s sophisticated media capabilities and dissemination of slick digital content to accelerate recruitment.\textsuperscript{114} Donors have invested heavily in communicative programming, which usually involves identifying local CSOs, often youth, women, or religious leaders with “credibility” in the relevant community, and providing these grassroots actors with the information and technical skills required to develop communications campaigns that often emphasize the development and delivery of a “counter-narrative” or “alternative-narrative.”\textsuperscript{115}

Although these programs are popular, there is little proof that counter-narratives in isolation are effective in reducing the threat of violent extremism, and it remains far from clear that they are informed by research.\textsuperscript{116} In fact, available research does not suggest


\textsuperscript{115} Examples of such initiatives include the EU’s Civil Society Empowerment Program, the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Challenging Extremism Together competitions for university students around the globe, and the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), with “one of its overarching strategies...to identify, cultivate, and expand a global network of partners whose voices resonate with individuals most vulnerable to harmful [terrorist and other] propaganda,” https://www.state.gov/r/otec/.

that the online terrorist propaganda is a causative factor in extremist violence.\textsuperscript{117} As a recent European Parliament study on counter-narratives concluded, “the concept itself is rather underdeveloped and lacks a thorough grounding in empirical research.”\textsuperscript{118} Existing counter-narrative programs rely on shaky metrics, sparse empirical foundations, lack a fully articulated theory to underpin their impact, and often fail to differentiate between radicalization and recruitment to violence.\textsuperscript{119} As such, as the above-mentioned study concludes, “there is a need for greater research in this area and effective monitoring and evaluation of current counter-narrative projects in order to be able to ensure that lessons are learned.”\textsuperscript{120}

Reviewing the existing evidence-base in 2016, Kate Ferguson challenged the prevailing assumptions that the consumption of violent words leads to violent deeds, counter-narratives can replace terrorist narratives, and the threat of violent extremism can be mitigated through discourse.\textsuperscript{121} While research indicates that certain patterns of communication, including hate speech, dehumanization, and identity-based messaging can contribute to fertile conditions for violent extremism, they are not analogous and any causal relationship remains unproven.\textsuperscript{122} Responding to each set of violent extremist narratives and its intended audience with a specifically designed counter-narrative fails to address why violent extremist rhetoric is “appealing in the first place.”\textsuperscript{123} Advocating retaliatory communications-based responses may therefore “underplay” the significance of identity, grievance, and trust in radicalization processes, and risk a superficial response to address violent extremism at a symptomatic rather than causative level.\textsuperscript{124} Yet, this and other scepticism\textsuperscript{125} surrounding the efficacy of the use of counter-narratives in P/CVE has not led to any decline in their use.

Among the reasons for the continued global popularity of these initiatives is that it allows the focus to remain on the behaviour and ideology of the violent extremists and not on the behaviour of governments towards their citizens and the grievance-generating structural issues in a society.\textsuperscript{126} This is among the reasons why there has been an overemphasis on the role that ideology emanating from outside of a country or society plays in violent extremism, leading to the neglect of structural, material, and psychological factors.\textsuperscript{127} Other reasons for the over-emphasis on counter-narrative and counter-messaging work relate to the fact that it is often more concrete and short-term in nature, and perceived as being more easily measurable than initiatives focused on addressing grievances or otherwise changing conditions on the ground. However, these metrics usually focus exclusively on output level data collating audience figures and immediate commentary or

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item 117 Ibid.
\item 122 Ibid.
\item 123 Ibid.
\item 124 Ibid.
\item 125 Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
responses to media content, rather than diagnosing any substantive change in, for example, an individual’s propensity or preference for violence. These evaluations are almost impossible to generalize and offer little analysis on the effectiveness of projects beyond fairly superficial benchmarks.

In contrast, alternative narratives and “preventive communications”\(^{128}\) may show more promise, drawing on experiences in development and peacebuilding. Issues of sourcing the right medium, message, and messenger are essential, but these interventions seem to be gaining traction because they are generally positive, proactive, and do not circulate paternalistic prohibitions or prescriptions regarding content. Instead, the focus is on facilitating conversation, encouraging awareness and empowering local voices through diverse forms of citizen journalism.\(^{129}\) Nevertheless, its application to P/CVE-specific goals is still relatively untested, and it remains to be seen whether its social and developmental impact can be replicated in what is a contested and often controversial space.

**HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARE OFTEN A KEY FACTOR OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

Another area with a disconnect between research and reality concerns the issue of human rights and the limited attention these issues receive in P/CVE conversations. This is despite the growing body of data and other evidence that shows support for terrorism and violent extremism is strongly correlated with human rights violations and other violence perpetrated by states against their own populations as part of, or in the name of, counterterrorism operations. In fact, excessive and routine police brutality and disproportionate security measures that are perceived to target certain communities are among the main sources of grievance that violent extremist propaganda exploits. This was underscored in the 2017 UNDP report, “Journey to Extremism in Africa,” where “state security-actor conduct is revealed as a prominent accelerator of recruitment, rather than the reverse.”\(^{130}\) The 2017 Global Terrorism Index’s examination of the drivers of terrorism “also demonstrates the risks of political crackdowns and counterterrorism actions that can exacerbate existing grievances and the drivers of extremism and terrorism.”\(^{131}\)

While some P/CVE interventions and capacity-building activities are integrating a focus on human rights, particularly in the context of law enforcement and community engagement,\(^{132}\) few if any multilateral discussions about P/CVE (outside of the UN Human Rights Council) give priority to the human rights dimensions of P/CVE. The UN devotes limited resources to helping ensure governments respect the freedoms of expression, association, and religion, and other international human rights obligations, while preventing and countering violent extremism.\(^{133}\) The newly established UNOCT with its more than 50-person (and growing) staff, includes just two human rights officers responsible for programming, which is not enough to guarantee the mainstreaming and considered political messaging required to do justice to the spirit of human rights dimensions of the UN PVE Plan of Action, let alone the UN Global Strategy. Furthermore, both human rights officers, due to the internal structure of UNOCT, do not appear to review

---

\(^{128}\) Communicative capacity building programs to strengthen organic, locally driven, and inclusive output. This includes, for example, training schemes in radio broadcasting and journalism, and the empowerment of neglected voices in recipient societies. While this is a broad intervention area, its central focus is developing capacity and widening (and improving) coverage rather than prescribing specific content.


\(^{130}\) “Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment,” UNDP, p.5.


\(^{132}\) Examples include STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE Kenya, which include work packages strengthening human rights modalities in the conduct of various security services engaged in both CT and P/CVE activities.

the majority of UNOCT programming and policy outputs. The (recently departed) UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has been outspoken in calling out countries for abuses committed in the name of counterterrorism and P/CVE. Unfortunately, his office still lacks the necessary capacity to provide governments (from security services to local police) with much-needed practical training, delivered by practitioners rather than academics, on how to design and implement human rights-compliant policies and programs to help reduce these threats. The Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, who continues to highlight the human rights shortcomings across certain national P/CVE efforts, lacks any full-time staff to support her work. Similarly, recent reforms to the UN counterterrorism and P/CVE architecture have yet to produce any meaningful increase in resources and focus on human rights, although UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism Voronkov’s recent remarks at a UN Human Rights Council side-event offer some hope.

Looking beyond the United Nations, some have lamented how the increase in donor funding for narrowly-tailored P/CVE projects, often focused on support for youth, women, religious leaders, or other civil society actors has had negative implications on funding for broader human rights, democracy, governance, and social cohesion programs. This is problematic as these broader activities can have a positive effect on increasing societal resilience against violent extremism, alongside the broader social benefits they are liable to produce anyway.

Increasing Limitations on Civil Society Space to Sustain a “Whole-of-Society” Approach to P/CVE

A further challenge to progress—and one linked to the human rights-related one—centers on the disconnect between the rhetoric about the role of civil society in P/CVE and some governments’ restrictions to CSOs, which has too often resulted in shrinking space for civil society to contribute to P/CVE efforts.

From the outset, a signature element of the P/CVE agenda (enshrined in the UN PVE Plan of Action and numerous other P/CVE framework documents) has been the need for a “whole-of-society” approach to addressing the threat of violent extremism, one which includes local civil society actors as key partners. This is based on the recognition of both the comparative advantages that local civil society, and CSOs more broadly, have when it comes to P/CVE, and the understanding that a vibrant independent civil society is a critical pillar for effective prevention of violent extremism.

In reality, while donor support for CSO-led P/CVE initiatives increases, and the number of youth, women, religious leaders, and other local civil society actors involved in P/CVE efforts grows, the political and legal space for civil society involvement in P/CVE (more broadly) continues to shrink. According to one estimate, more than 63 countries have passed restrictive laws in recent years, shrinking the space for civil society, including restricting or banning foreign funding and imposing onerous registration requirements. In the past few years, governments in both the global North and South have been arresting civil society

---


137 Ibid.


A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur on Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association has pointed to the rise in “declaration of states of emergency, sometimes without adequate justification, the use of vague wording to define acts of terrorism and threats to public security, and broad legal provisions that give room for abusive interpretations of limitations of the right to peaceful assembly and association.”\footnote{Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, 38th Session, Human Rights Council, 13 June 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session38/Documents/A_HRC_38_34_EN.docx, p.5} Civil society often bears the brunt of these limitations. UN Secretary-General Guterres has echoed this concern, emphasizing how governments are using counterterrorism policies to suppress peaceful protests and legitimate opposition groups, shut down debates, target and detain human rights defenders, and stigmatize minorities.\footnote{Secretary-General Guterres speech at School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, “Counter-terrorism and human rights: winning the fight while upholding our values,” 16 November, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-11-16/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-speech-soas-university-london-%E2%80%99s-counter-terrorism.}

Beyond legal and political restrictions, CSOs often face challenges in the provision of meaningful services and support to local communities, while trying to establish safe and productive relationships with government entities. This is because there is a tendency of some governments to see civil society as an adversary rather than an ally in P/CVE efforts, especially in relation to “sensitive” domains such as the reintegration and rehabilitation of returning FTFs or other former violent extremists and their families.

Somewhat remarkably, despite all the rhetoric around the importance of “whole-of-society” approaches to P/CVE and the need to empower youth, women, and other civil society voices and perspectives in policy-level discussions—including for the purpose of ensuring that local, on-the-ground experience and expertise is informing decision-makers—there are too few examples of this happening in practice.

Multilateral P/CVE discussions, whether at the UN or in regional bodies, are dominated by national governments, with CSO participation being—if invited—generally limited to a few organizations speaking about the projects they are implementing. The participation of representatives from local authorities remains virtually non-existent. Multilateral institutions have rarely sought to facilitate systematic and sustained exchange between CSOs and governments around challenges, prescriptions, and actionable recommendations for more effective P/CVE policymaking and programming, despite the recognition of its necessity to sustainable solutions. However, if the recent proposal to create a civil society unit in UNOCT—with facilitating more multi-stakeholder P/CVE interactions as one of its objectives—is in fact implemented properly, the UN may finally be in a position to assume more of a leadership role in this space.\footnote{“Engaging Civil Society,” a UNOCT proposal for establishing a civil society unit, September 2018 (copy on file with authors).}

At the national level, despite the growing recognition of the positive role that civil society actors can play in P/CVE, the increase in the number of CSO-led projects in this area, and the need for their voices and perspectives to inform national-level policy-making, there are few mechanisms to ensure that the voices of youth-focused, women-led, and other CSOs are heard and taken into account by policymakers throughout the P/CVE policymaking and program development process.

CSOs find themselves in an increasingly conflicted policy environment. They face legal, security-related, and political challenges, such as accessing P/CVE policy conversations, but are simultaneously encouraged to become more active P/CVE actors, with additional
conditions and contingencies imposed on their funding. Resolving this conflict in ways that create more opportunities for CSOs to contribute to P/CVE needs to become a higher priority for all those interested in sustaining the “whole-of-society” approach that lies at the core of the global P/CVE agenda.  

Gaps Remain in Knowledge about (Preventing and Countering) Violent Extremism

A final challenge is that despite the increased, contextualized research on the factors contributing to violent extremism, significant gaps remain. This includes understanding why some areas, populations, or communities are more or less vulnerable than others to violent extremism, and what community- or individual-focused P/CVE interventions are most likely to succeed. There is currently little consensus regarding the effectiveness and impact of preventive programming, largely due to problems regarding the different definitions of P/CVE (or CVE and PVE), data collection, data quality and data shortages. Consequently, interventions are often framed by an assumption-based discourse that seems intuitive, but requires further testing, particularly in terms of their applicability across different contexts.

This has led to a persistent reliance on assumption-based programmatic logic, even across relatively mainstream, well-funded activities, including, for example, gender-centric initiatives, counter-narrative campaigns, and the use of faith actors and religious institutions. RUSI, through the Norwegian-funded, phase II of the Prevention Project (PPII), hopes to alleviate these limitations by unpacking the assumptions, conceptual coherence, applicability, and functionality of P/CVE interventions to build a more rigorous understanding of what works, what can work, and what does not, and in what context(s). By interrogating the validity of underlying theories of change and improving the evidence-base for preventive best practice, the project aims to not only enhance the delivery of programs, but to develop and share a better understanding of P/CVE theory and practice across all stakeholders, including governments and CSOs.

Phase II is responding to the fact that the majority of investments in P/CVE research have so far focused on Europe (and the West more broadly), with the EU, for example, funding major, multi-year projects that examine the causes of violent extremism within EU member states and which P/CVE approaches have and have not worked (see, e.g., IMPACT Europe) inside of Europe. RUSI’s review of available published and unpublished literature globally provides further evidence of this (a more detailed summary of the methodology is in Annex 2). Although the process is still ongoing, there is nevertheless a clear concentration of evaluation material focusing on Western Europe (68 studies), in contrast to other regions including North America (28 studies) and East Africa (27 studies), even at this preliminary stage (see Tables 1 and 2). The UK is particularly saturated with 54 studies (see Table 3). This is not especially surprising given the scope and maturity of the UK Prevent model, and its assumed propensity, rightly or wrongly, to serve as a template for other states.
Tables 1 and 2: Available Literature on P/CVE Interventions According to Region and Continent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; Eastern Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTINENT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elsexwhere it is also clear the research is mostly clustered in specific countries (see Table 3): Nigeria and Indonesia are outliers in the coverage they receive relative to their wider regions, and 23 of 27 studies focusing on East Africa analyze interventions in either Somalia or Kenya. This pattern raises important implications. As argued in this report, both violent extremism and by necessity P/CVE are contextually-defined dynamics, leading to the prospect of research becoming reductive and even siloed between states. A broader distribution of both investment and evidence collection is necessary to avoid becoming reliant on either generic approaches that have not been tested across different environments, or, perhaps more problematically, the generalization of results derived from specific contexts. Both these scenarios are liable to produce flawed assumptions that could be circulated and recycled in the programmatic logics of future P/CVE interventions, perpetuating many of the flaws and faults already highlighted in this report.

Table 3: Available Literature on P/CVE Interventions According to Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond the geographical limitations, research is often carried out by academics experiencing difficulties in accessing the frequently sensitive data, not least because they likely lack the necessary security clearances. Information sharing relies on a culture of transparency and receptivity, which is challenging when data is sensitive, securitized, and heavily regulated.\(^{146}\) In turn, policy-makers often do not have the time or inclination to digest dense academic products. This has arguably led to an “explosion of speculations with little empirical grounding in academia, which has the methodological applications of the findings.”

skills but lacks data for a major breakthrough.”

In other cases, much of the research is not widely translated or accessible (e.g., government-commissioned research is sometimes kept internal) or consumed by government policy makers or those involved in the design and implementation of P/CVE initiatives. Many unsubstantiated assumptions are continually recycled in the literature due to this academic “stagnation,” resulting in relatively baseless or often deleterious suppositions becoming institutionalised knowledge.

Crucially however, there are also significant challenges in measuring the impact of programs that aim to prevent something from happening rather than achieve a visible, concrete outcome. Evaluating the mechanics of programs is problematic as any metric relies on an imperfect set of proxies to “prove a negative,” particularly as ethical constraints and “messy” conditions on the ground make comparisons between treatment and control groups unfeasible. The programmatic logic of an intervention or its theory of change can often become incoherent as the path from delivery to impact on end target groups is “long and winding.”

Understanding and tracing relationships within a litany of variables is difficult, especially when evaluators cannot disaggregate and segregate the specific impact of a project from other interventions and shifts in the wider milieu. This can make attribution difficult to ascertain. The lack of short (and manageable) causal chains makes it tricky to exclude rival explanations for a particular result. Causality is further complicated by the reality that intended outcomes in P/CVE usually involve nothing happening. Given the diversity of focus areas and vague, multilayered policy objectives, it is also hard to formulate indicators of success that relate concrete measures to impact on recipients.

Many expected outcomes in P/CVE involve ephemeral changes related to cognition and opinion, which are tough to rigorously track, especially when there is paucity of secure baselines for comparison.

Meanwhile, practitioners are reticent to divert resources away from core programming, and there is little appetite on the part of local clients to publicize their failures under the rubric of “lessons learned,” especially if they depend on donor funding. Concrete assessments are similarly encumbered by the immaturity of programs; many long-term projects are only just starting to conclude and completed projects were often built with purposely short time-horizons, limiting opportunities for analysis and evaluation.

P/CVE M&E regimes therefore tend to concentrate on programmatic outputs to at least demonstrate the functionality and efficiency of activities. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, found only five independent, published studies reporting outcome level data in a review of preventive and corrective interventions in March 2016. RUSI’s research, which has a different methodology to START (see Appendix 2), has assessed the availability of literature and identifies a number of preliminary findings. Significantly, RUSI’s research highlights a thematic concentration (see Table 4). The popularity of counter-narrative interventions as a focus for evaluation and analysis, second only to education projects, supports the finding that donors, practitioners, and researchers tend to favor short-term programs that are seemingly easier to measure, at least at the output level. Output results are often impossible to generalize and offer no substantive assessment on the effectiveness of projects beyond superficial benchmarks that do not account for externalities and indirect or long-term impact. Where attempts have been made to map effectiveness, data is often anecdotal and descriptive, making inferences

149 Ibid.
about impact that is conjectural, dependent on narrative interpretations, and difficult to validate. Where outcome evaluations do exist, they are often conducted by the program implementers themselves, who can lack the necessary objectivity and training, rather than independent professional evaluators.152

Table 4: Available Literature on P/CVE Interventions According to Intervention Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVENTION THEME</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDIES</th>
<th>AVERAGE QUALITY (OUT OF 19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>4 (9)</td>
<td>16.5 (14.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>63 (71)</td>
<td>13.5 (13.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-narratives</td>
<td>40 (46)</td>
<td>13.7 (13.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>4 (6)</td>
<td>16 (15.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>4 (12)</td>
<td>13.8 (13.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>6 (8)</td>
<td>14.3 (13.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>6 (7)</td>
<td>14.3 (14.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>10 (21)</td>
<td>13.3 (13.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/gender</td>
<td>15 (20)</td>
<td>13.7 (13.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online</td>
<td>4 (7)</td>
<td>12 (12.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers in brackets includes studies that examine a package of interventions, where at least one of the interventions falls within this theme.

If research continues to prefer and prioritize certain vectors of P/CVE activity, it will be difficult to expand the evidence base for the field as a whole in ways conducive to experimentation and innovation. Without a more holistic appraisal of where different interventions work (or do not) and why, there is a risk P/CVE may stagnate.

151 See note 144.
152 See, e.g., CDA Collaborative, https://www.cdacollaborative.org/.
CONCLUSION

Although not without its challenges, the relatively nascent “whole of society” P/CVE agenda should be strengthened and sustained, particularly given the lessons of the past 17 years of counterterrorism practice and the nature of today’s threats. Despite potentially complicating the process by involving a diverse spectrum of government and non-government, national and sub-national stakeholders, approaches, and priorities, the agenda has made important progress over the past few years as it continues to grapple with a variety of constraints. These include financial and methodological difficulties, risk aversion, a disconnect between political rhetoric and realities, insufficient technical capabilities, and the challenge of convincing publics that more investments in non-kinetic measures to address the threat of violent extremism will make them more secure.

Nevertheless, violent extremism persists as a multi-faceted, dynamic threat, requiring national leadership and multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary solutions, with CSOs and other local actors at the center of the action. More innovative, locally owned, and evidence-led responses—as opposed to assumption- or politically-led ones—across contextually distinct environments need to be developed and implemented. Collaboration and cooperation between national and local actors needs strengthening and P/CVE interventions need to be synchronized more effectively while encouraging co-creation between different actors. This could refine how practitioners and policy-makers monitor and evaluate their work, thus challenging our assumptions and expanding the knowledge base. These and other steps are all necessary for strengthening our engagement in this space. Similarly, it is incumbent on stakeholders to recognise the limitations of P/CVE and more accurately diagnose when it is relevant and where it can add value. Understanding the current “state-of-play,” including a critical appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses and the comparative advantages of the different stakeholders, particularly civil society, is necessary for prescribing substantive, constructive guidance that can consolidate progress already made and secure more effective interventions moving forward. In line with this objective, the Prevention Project and RUSI have elaborated a series of holistic, actionable recommendations to help improve this space on a number of levels.
RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations focus on how to strengthen locally-led P/CVE efforts, in particular those involving civil society, local authorities, and communities.\textsuperscript{153} The P/CVE field has become increasingly multi-disciplinary, complex, and broad, therefore a number of important P/CVE topics, particularly those that have received extensive treatment elsewhere—such as gender\textsuperscript{154} and countering online radicalization\textsuperscript{155}—are not addressed in detail.

The recommendations are directed at community-based organizations and other CSOs, local authorities, national governments, and intergovernmental bodies dealing with P/CVE. However, given the multi-stakeholder nature of P/CVE, in many cases it is not possible to assign responsibility to one set of stakeholders. In most cases the recommendations require action from multiple actors, often both within and outside of government.

I. Strengthen locally-led P/CVE efforts.

A. Be mindful of the public discourse around violent extremism and P/CVE and how it impacts local communities.
   1. Ensure policies and programs take into account the developing threat picture and all forms of violent extremism to have maximum impact and minimize the risks of stigmatization and alienation of local communities;
   2. Be sensitive to where and when the terms “violent extremism” and “P/CVE” are used and how those terms are perceived within various communities; and
   3. Allow communities to define their concerns and priorities and reflect that in programming.

B. Deepen investments in programs that build trust between local police and communities in P/CVE efforts, which is critical to the effectiveness of those efforts.
   1. Strengthen or establish new local safety councils and other mechanisms of engagement that include law enforcement, local officials, and community representatives, with a focus on safety issues identified to be a priority to the community, including violent extremism;
   2. Expand training and other resources for local law enforcement and other security actors on P/CVE emphasizing engagement with non-security actors;
   3. Separate community engagement and counter-terrorism functions in police departments;
   4. Consider how local law enforcement and communities engage and how power dynamics affect those engagements; and
   5. Encourage informal means of engagement to build trust, such as joint sports and arts events.

C. Incentivize innovation in locally-led P/CVE efforts.

1. Encourage risk taking, including through creating safe spaces where all P/CVE stakeholders (including donors) can openly discuss the successes and failures of different P/CVE interventions;
2. Ensure M&E efforts can publicly reflect negative outcomes and map information about previous P/CVE failures for learning purposes;

\textsuperscript{153} Some of these recommendations have previously been presented by the Prevention Project, at times in collaboration with other organizations.
3. Publish desensitized final evaluation documents;
4. Allocate a portion of all P/CVE funding to grantees that are new to P/CVE;[^156] and
5. Allow for flexibility within existing grants to account for changing landscapes.

**D. Work through existing structures and organizations.** Where appropriate, rather than initiating new, local P/CVE projects, work through or otherwise leverage existing, community-based programs, structures, and organizations. In cases where there is an identified need, consideration should be given to integrating P/CVE into a broader intervention that addresses issues that may be of a higher priority of the particular community, such as violence, drugs, education, or youth unemployment.

**E. Establish where appropriate, multi-donor funds at the country level to support locally-led projects aligned with relevant P/CVE NAPs.** Such funds should be locally-owned and driven by the needs and priorities of the relevant national and sub-national government and non-governmental stakeholders. They should ideally be public-private in nature and aligned with a grants program that provides technical assistance and other capacity-building support to grantees and incentivizes collaboration and networking among CSOs and other local partners. Where appropriate, such funds could be linked to and managed by GCERF, possibly in collaboration with the UNDP.

**F. Increase the availability of technical and other capacity-building assistance for the development of locally-led multi-disciplinary and multi-agency intervention programs around P/CVE.**

1. The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) should develop good practices in this field, with inputs from a diversity of local law enforcement and non-law enforcement practitioners and other professionals;
2. The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), in collaboration with the UN, OSCE, and SCN, should develop training materials and programs to support the tailored implementation of these good practices in different local contexts; and
3. Donors should support the delivery of assistance, including by the IIJ and international NGOs based on these modules.

**II. Enhance the contribution of CSOs to P/CVE**

**A. Build the capacity of CSOs to contribute to addressing violent extremism, beyond simply implementing donor-identified P/CVE projects.**

1. Provide core organizational support and training on research and analysis, program design, proposal writing, M&E, communications and branding, and management;
2. Provide P/CVE training to CSOs that have experience in related fields but are new to P/CVE to enable them to integrate P/CVE into ongoing programs and inform P/CVE policies and discussions with their relevant experience and expertise; and
3. Translate P/CVE resources into local languages for local CSOs and make them accessible online.

**B. Engage CSOs as partners in P/CVE not just project implementers.**

1. Ensure that CSOs and other local actors are meaningfully involved in the design and implementation of P/CVE policies and programs and in the development of P/CVE strategies when setting funding priorities;
2. Seek out the voices and perspectives of youth-focused and women-led organizations and others beyond the “usual suspects” or “donor darlings”;

3. Support longer-term P/CVE programs for CSOs, allowing for flexibility in the design and implementation phases;
4. Provide CSOs with core funding to allow them to think more strategically and better position themselves to act as change agents beyond the life of individual projects; and
5. Take risks in terms of investing in experimental and genuinely innovative new programming, or collaborate with “unpalatable” but important local stakeholders.

C. Incentivize and support collaboration among CSOs working in the P/CVE space.
1. Support and facilitate collaboration among CSOs and networks of CSOs, including in such areas as training, project opportunities, context and stakeholder mapping, and impact assessments;
2. Invest more in focused, small-grants programs that include opportunities for substantive grantee collaboration beyond the hosting of conferences and workshops dominated by the same faces and same topics; and
3. Prioritize the sharing of lessons learned and experiences in the design and implementation of such programs.

D. Remove barriers to CSO involvement in P/CVE.\textsuperscript{157}
1. Condemn the growing number of restrictions being placed on civil society around the globe, in particular as they relate to freedom of association, the media, and assembly, often in the name of counterterrorism, and support their independence;
2. Expedite the issuance of visas and offer multi-entry visas to facilitate CSO participation in regional and international P/CVE conferences, workshops, and trainings; and
3. Make better use of technology to facilitate the participation of human rights defenders and other independent CSOs who may be unable or reluctant to participate in multilateral or other P/CVE conversations in person.

E. Involve CSOs in rehabilitation and reintegration programs for violent extremists.\textsuperscript{158}
1. National governments should develop legal and policy frameworks to enable CSOs to work with returning FTFs and former violent extremists and their families in rehabilitation and reintegration interventions. Such frameworks should help clarify legal risks associated with engaging with “formers” and other individuals who might have been or are the subject of a criminal investigation or prosecution;
2. Promote constructive, continuous engagement (including information sharing) between law enforcement and CSOs (and the broader community), throughout the design and implementation phase of rehabilitation and reintegration programs;
3. Provide CSOs, where appropriate, more access to prison environments and violent extremist offenders and suspects, while delivering concurrent training for prison staff to build institutional capacity; and
4. Ensure gender-sensitive rehabilitation and reintegration and after-care programs, which requires ongoing research on the role gender plays in both radicalization and recruitment and rehabilitation and reintegration processes.


D. Encourage CSO and municipal-level partnerships with the private sector and emphasize local fundraising to support the sustainability of P/CVE efforts.

1. Prioritize engagement beyond social media and technology where firms are already deeply engaged on the topic;
2. Develop youth mentorship programs in collaboration with the private sector. Such programs could be coordinated by or developed in conjunction with the World Bank and the UNDP, among other potentially relevant international institutions;
3. Promote social enterprise initiatives to apply innovative business practices to drive sustained social change connected to addressing drivers of violent extremism; and
4. Encourage collaborations between the private sector and academics or research institutions to analyze and evaluate existing research and program findings.

E. To maximize the space for CSOs to contribute to P/CVE the UN and other multilateral bodies should:

1. Speak out against undue restrictions on CSOs, including measures taken in the name of countering terrorism and violent extremism;
2. Acknowledge and advocate for the crucial role CSOs play in P/CVE;
3. Facilitate structured engagement between CSOs and multilateral bodies to ensure a diversity of CSO input and participation in multilateral conversations on P/CVE;
4. Intensify engagement between the UN counterterrorism and P/CVE architecture and independent, local civil society actors to ensure on-the-ground perspectives and realities are more fully reflected in UN counterterrorism and P/CVE policymaking and programming decisions.

a. Ensure the planned UNOCT civil society unit is appropriately mandated, resourced, and staffed to facilitate effective dialogue with independent CSOs from around the globe;

b. Use the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee “Arria formula” on a semi-annual basis to enable human rights defenders and other CSOs to share on-the-ground perspectives on both the impact of P/CVE and counterterrorism measures on civil society, and the contributions civil society actors are making to reduce the threats of violent extremism and terrorism at the local level;

c. Have the UN PVE Group of Friends focus more attention on both the contributions of CSOs to advancing the global P/CVE agenda and limitations being placed on them by some governments. This could include semi-annual meetings on this topic; and

d. Have senior UN counterterrorism and P/CVE officials use country visits to meet with independent CSOs as they seek to understand the nature of the violent extremist threats; remind host governments of the importance of including CSOs across the spectrum of P/CVE work; identify any good practices or limitations on CSOs; and include this information in relevant country and thematic assessments and reports.

5. Establish a UN-CSO advisory board consisting of representatives from a geographically diverse group of independent CSOs to provide the UN, UNOCT, the Security Council, and other relevant UN bodies with regular, direct feedback on the ground.

---

159 Some of these recommendations are drawn from “Recommendations for Improving UN Support of Human Rights-based and Inclusive Counterterrorism and P/CVE Efforts,” which were formulated by the Global Center on Cooperative Security and the Prevention Project in August 2018. These recommendations were informed by events hosted by the two organizations on the margins of the sixth biennial review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and High-Level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States, with the support of the governments of Norway and Sweden. See: http://www.organizingagainstvve.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC-and-PP_GCTS_HR-Recommendations-1.pdf.

160 The UN OCT is proposing to establish two-to-five person unit that will facilitate structured engagement and consultations with CSOs and the development of a CSO forum on P/CVE and counterterrorism at the United Nations. “Engaging Civil Society,” UN OCT, August 2018 (copy on file with authors).

161 “The Arria Formula is an informal arrangement that allows the [Security] Council greater flexibility to be briefed about international peace and security issues. It has been used frequently and assumed growing importance since it was first implemented in March, 1992”. James Paul, “The Arria Formula,” Global Policy Forum, October 2003, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/40088.html.
III. Strengthen cooperation and collaboration among national and sub-national authorities and other stakeholders relevant to P/CVE.

A. Empower and support the role of municipalities and other sub-national authorities in P/CVE.

1. Map existing P/CVE and related capacities and resources of municipalities and other sub-national authorities;
2. Focus more attention on building prevention capacities of such actors, including by supporting and leveraging the SCN; and
3. Involve relevant sub-national authorities in the development of P/CVE NAPs and ensure the plans include a clear division of labor among national and sub-national authorities, and that the latter has the necessary resources to implement its P/CVE responsibilities.

B. Develop and implement inclusive, multi-stakeholder, evidence-based P/CVE NAPs. National authorities and other relevant stakeholders should ensure the NAP development process and relevant P/CVE plans, strategies, and policies are:

1. Based on trust and transparency and driven by those outside of the national security establishment to include representatives of municipalities and other sub-national authorities, CSOs, research and academic institutions, and the private sector, as well as a gender dimension;
2. Based on research and data on the causative factors of violent extremism in different communities, as well on what has worked to make some communities more resilient than others;

and thematically diverse group of CSOs—this could be modeled on the approach taken by UN Women or the UNDP. To liaise with the UN to ensure that different independent CSO perspectives and concerns are heard and reflected in UN P/CVE and counterterrorism policies, programs, and dialogues;

6. Increase UN funding support for independent CSOs working in the P/CVE.

a. Dedicate 20 percent of its P/CVE funds (e.g., from the UN Center on Counter-Terrorism) to support CSO-led research or interventions and projects that would be co-designed and delivered by CSOs. Such funding could also be directed to support and help sustain the growing number of CSO-led P/CVE networks discussed in the report;

b. Direct funding to GCERF, which would benefit considerably from UN funding and political support; and
c. Pilot the creation of P/CVE NAP local implementation funds in a few interested countries where GCERF is not currently present. Such mechanisms could be designed to leverage contributions from multiple donors and provide small grants to CSOs and other local actors to implement projects linked to the implementation of the NAP; and be joint UN-GCERF initiatives that leverage GCERF’s existing grant-making and M&E capacities at headquarters in Geneva.


163 The UNDP Civil Society Advisory Committee was established in 2000 “to systematize the consultation process between UNDP and civil society actors at the global level” and “currently functions as the main institutional mechanism for dialogue between civil society leaders and UNDP senior management”, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/partners/civil_society_organizations/advisorycommittee.html.

3. Supported by the evidence, acknowledges the need to address long-term structural injustices, poor governance, and securitized responses, and do not overstate the role of ideology as a causative factor of violent extremism;
4. Clear in assigning roles and responsibilities among the different stakeholders involved in implementation and inclusive of a mapping of existing capacities (e.g., education, health, sport, social welfare, youth engagement) in the country, aligning responsibilities where those capacities are located, i.e., at the national, state, municipal, or community level;
5. Coordinated with existing P/CVE efforts in the relevant country;
6. Complemented, where appropriate, by sub-national action plans focusing attention on local drivers and priorities, and facilitating enhanced coordination among the various actors working on P/CVE issues in a region within a country;
7. Aligned with relevant strategies both in the security and non-security spheres;
8. Inclusive of an M&E plan to assess challenges, successes, and overall impact; and are time-limited, allowing for them to be reviewed and updated periodically; and
9. Supported with the necessary resources, guidance, and political will from the national authorities to enable sustained implementation.

C. Broader support to countries to develop P/CVE NAPs. International assistance in support of NAPs, including through the Hedayah-Global Center on Cooperative Security NAP Task Force, should:
1. Reinforce linkages between promoting human rights, good governance, and the rule of law and counterterrorism, and help ensure that the NAP development process does not reinforce counterproductive counterterrorism practices;
2. Involve experts from a range of disciplines to include strategic planning, budgeting, human rights, governance, law enforcement, education, local governance, and public health;
3. Include local expertise at every stage wherever possible;
4. Include a strong human rights dimension that seeks to ensure that the NAP planning process and related programs are data-driven, non-discriminatory, and adhere to the principle of “do no harm;” and
5. Ensure that P/CVE NAP development efforts follow or are complemented by an inclusive national discourse on violent extremism and P/CVE.

D. Enable more regional and national dialogues aimed at strengthening national-local cooperation and collaboration around P/CVE.
1. The SCN should facilitate a sustained dialogue in select countries aimed at strengthening cooperation among national and sub-national P/CVE stakeholders. Such dialogues should include national and local government representatives, parliamentarians, CSOs, the private sector, researchers, and community leaders. Dialogues should address issues related to trust-building and information sharing, and the comparative advantages and P/CVE roles and responsibilities of the different levels of actors and different sectors within a country;
2. The SCN and GCTF should organize a series of regional workshops involving national and local policymakers and practitioners to share experiences, best practices, lessons learned, and challenges around collaboration and cooperation among different levels of actors (e.g., national, municipal, and community);
3. The SCN and GCTF should elaborate good practices on national-local cooperation and collaboration around P/CVE. These good practices, which could be informed by the national and regional dialogues mentioned above, could be finalized in advance of and presented at the 2019 SCN Summit in Los Angeles and the September 2019 GCTF ministerial in New York.
IV. Enhance the P/CVE contributions of development institutions, including the OECD, the World Bank, and other development assistance providers.

A. Development institutions generally should:
1. Help identify and address key structural causative factors of violent extremism in specific contexts, including those related to the economy, corruption, service delivery, and weak governance;
2. Focus more attention on those groups with the strongest feelings of exclusion and marginalization, and on building resilience within them;
3. Pursue more coordinated engagement with security actors, acknowledging that development interventions and tools alone cannot address the governance and human rights deficits and other drivers of violent extremism linked to the behavior of the state;
4. Make a stronger case for the relevance of ODA programs for P/CVE and that such programs need to include a P/CVE dimension. Develop and disseminate guidelines to governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs for determining the potential P/CVE-relevance of ODA programs and to assess the impact of P/CVE-specific programs;
5. Call for stronger linkages between the UN 2030 Agenda—in particular Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) and the global P/CVE agenda—as part of a continuing effort to break down barriers between security and development actors in the context of P/CVE.
   a. As part of the in-depth review of SDG 16 in 2019 at the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, governments should take stock of which P/CVE activities are being undertaken in furtherance of SDG 16.
   b. The UNDP, or another appropriate entity, should collect and analyze this data to inform the 2019 review on how the linkages between P/CVE and SDG 16 are realized in practice and how such linkages could be further strengthened.
6. Mitigate fragmentation in the P/CVE field. Consider developing a pilot initiative in one or two countries to pursue a more integrated approach to problem diagnosis, programmatic and policy response, and M&E, to arrive at a shared understanding of the factors of violent extremism in a specific context, what interventions are needed to address them, and which actor should be responsible for funding or implementing each of them. This could be linked to ongoing efforts to support the development of national P/CVE action plans, where there are receptive host governments.

A. The OECD should take on a larger role in guiding P/CVE programming and facilitating P/CVE coordination among donors. The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and its Secretariat should consider:
1. Updating its PVE guidelines and further populating the ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace, and Security Activities to include more varied examples of PVE assistance to provide donors greater clarity on the specific activities that fit within the PVE guidelines and to facilitate the identification and sharing of both good and bad PVE practices;
2. Assigning a Creditor Reporting System “code” to PVE in its databases to enable the Secretariat to gather data on how much OECD members are spending on PVE (as part of their ODA-eligible expenditures), where the money is being spent, and on what types of specific activities. Support should also be leased to ongoing project mapping, such as RUSI’s PPII project, as well as analyzing financial flows across the P/CVE space more broadly;
3. Leveraging its program evaluation, peer review, and networking tools for purposes of improving the quality and effectiveness of PVE aid; and
4. Serving as a platform for convening discussion on the use of development aid for, and the
collection of data on, PVE activities so that the sector is more closely monitored and understood from a development perspective.

B. The World Bank should continue to apply its experience on conflict-sensitive development to the challenge of violent extremism. The Bank should consider investing more in:

1. Community-based approaches that focus on engaging and empowering youth and other local civil society actors as agents of change;
2. Strengthening its gender analysis within wider conflict and violent extremism analyses;
3. Applying its experience in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration to the challenges associated with the reverse flows of FTFs and individuals leaving terrorist organizations, with a focus on communities and relevant individuals;
4. Drawing on the expertise of its relevant global practice groups, including those focused on governance, education, and social and urban resilience, and, where appropriate, incorporating P/CVE into interventions developed and led by these groups; and
5. Involving itself in global policy and programming discussions around P/CVE, including, if appropriate, by serving as the institutional home of the currently ad hoc community of practice on P/CVE.

V. Improve the evidence base for and monitoring and evaluation of P/CVE efforts.

A. Ensure P/CVE interventions are evidence-based rather than driven by other considerations.

1. Highlight publicly the connections between strengthened governance and P/CVE where the evidence demonstrates that grievances generated by governance deficits are key factors of violent extremism;
2. Avoid over-emphasizing the impact of counter-narratives and strategic communications in addressing levels of violent extremism, while focusing more attention and resources on developing local responses that are more likely to address conditions on the ground that terrorists seek to exploit;
3. Devote more programmatic and policy attention at the international and regional levels to the connections between the protection of human rights and effectively preventing and countering violent extremism. This includes having the UN Secretary-General and senior UN counterterrorism officials, including the Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism speak out more regularly when human rights are violated in the name of counterterrorism, preventing violent extremism, and national security; and underscore that responses that breach human rights can create serious grievances against the state, undermining future efforts and diminishing societal resilience against violent extremism; and
4. Increase the capacity of the UN and relevant regional bodies to provide governments (from the security services to the local police) with practical training on how to design human rights-compliant policies and programs that can prevent and counter violent extremism.

B. Develop a “Center for Understanding Violent Extremism and Monitoring and Evaluating P/CVE Interventions” to address limitations in P/CVE research and M&E.

1. Such a center should not conduct its own research or other programming but could, among other things:
   a. Gather, analyze, and make accessible existing studies on the drivers of violent extremism in different regional, national, and local contexts;

b. Gather, generate, analyze, and share more data on (1) what has and has not worked to prevent, counter, and build resilience against violent extremism and other forms of violence, and (2) how to monitor and measure the effectiveness of P/CVE programs to allocate existing resources better and help bolster the argument for more investments;

c. Provide guidance on the design of effective P/CVE interventions;

d. Enable the translation and dissemination of more P/CVE research and programming tools into the relevant local languages;

e. Offer independent M&E services to donors and program implementers. Donors and other interested stakeholders could, where appropriate, be asked to pay an annual fee to the center to access the research and data, and take advantage of the M&E services; and

f. Draw in expertise from a range of disciplines to reflect its multi-disciplinary nature.

2. The Center should expand on the efforts of IMPACT Europe and other relevant institutions and initiatives and should be part of an existing international body such as the World Bank, OECD, Hedayah, GCERF, or RESOLVE, a university, or other research institution.

C. Develop a “Global Resource Center for Youth against Violent Extremism” to facilitate more pooling of resources, expertise, and networking, and allow for more lessons learned among the growing number of disparate youth-focused programs and platforms related to violent extremism.

1. This center would, among other things:

a. Provide training and other support to the growing number of young people contributing or interested in contributing to efforts to build resilience against violence extremism in their communities and beyond;

b. Provide a much-needed platform to access existing tool kits, best practices, and practical guides for developing youth-focused or youth-led P/CVE programs, including ones focused on developing positive alternatives to violent extremist narratives;

c. Provide technical advice to donors and youth-based or youth-focused organizations on the design, monitoring, and evaluation of youth-led or -focused programs, and initiatives aimed at preventing or countering violent extremism;

d. Connect the growing number of often under-resourced youth networks;

e. Facilitate the convening of local and national government representatives with young activists working on P/CVE within their regions to build stronger in-country networks;

f. Advise governments on how best to allow for effective engagement and participation of youth in discussions about violent extremism and how to prevent it, and in the design and implementation of P/CVE policies and programs;

g. Build and leverage partnerships with the private sector to develop innovative vocational, mentorship, and other youth programs aimed at communities where feelings of marginalization, injustice, and exclusion are particularly strong; and

h. Advocate for more refined research, including the delineation between boys and girls in data sets under the category of children and youth.

2. This center should be housed within the UN, the World Bank, or another existing institution, such as Hedayah.
A Roadmap to Progress
## APPENDIX 1

### Examples of P/CVE Initiatives Led by Civil Society Organizations or other Local Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</th>
<th>WEBSITE</th>
<th>FOCUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Participation</td>
<td>Cultural Center DamaD</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td><a href="http://www.kcdamad.org">www.kcdamad.org</a></td>
<td>Cultural Center DamaD is a peace-building organization with a focus on promoting a culture of peace and tolerance; encouraging dialogue and cooperation; enhancing, protecting, and promoting human and minority rights; empowering women and promoting gender equality as a precondition for sustainable development; education for democracy; and enabling citizens to actively participate in decision-making processes. It is the lead Serbian CSO in the EU-supported regional CSO hub for P/CVE being developed in the Western Balkans and is also spearheading the expansion of a multi-disciplinary referral mechanism for the early prevention of violent extremism in Novi Pazar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Resilience</td>
<td>North American Family Institute (NAFI)</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nafi.com">http://www.nafi.com</a></td>
<td>NAFI manages a mentoring program between the Boston Police Department and Somali-American youth to enhance the resilience of the Somali-American community in Boston. The project Youth Police Initiative Plus (YPiP) builds off of previously conducted Youth Police Initiatives, conducted in over 25 jurisdictions, including Boston, since 2003, for the purpose of lowering general youth violence and crime by creating stronger connections between youth and police. The YPiP project focuses on international terrorist organizations most often targeting Somali-American youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-narratives</td>
<td>Albanian Muslim Intellectual Forum</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td><a href="http://resonantvoices.info/project-item/cve-web-portal/">http://resonantvoices.info/project-item/cve-web-portal/</a></td>
<td>The Albanian Muslim Intellectual Forum serves as an expert center in the field of Islamic education and culture. The Forum leads a project in the Elbasan region in Albania titled: Educate Peace Messengers to CVE, focusing on strengthening the response from civil society to prevent violent extremism through building multi-stakeholder coalitions to develop counter-narratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-narratives</td>
<td>SOMEONE (Social Media Education Every day)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td><a href="http://projectsomeone.ca/">http://projectsomeone.ca/</a></td>
<td>SOMEONE was launched in May 2016 with 11 distinct multimedia, curricular, and public engagement projects focusing on critical thinking, information literacy, and social pedagogy. It creates spaces for pluralistic dialogues and combating online hate by training key stakeholders in schools, public safety, criminal justice, NGOs, and social service providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-narratives</td>
<td>America Abroad Media</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td><a href="http://www.americaabroadmedia.org">http://www.americaabroadmedia.org</a></td>
<td>America Broad Media hosts hackathons bringing together diverse groups of Muslim and non-Muslim artists to develop communications campaigns and content that not only counters the influence of ISIL, but also encourages and enables community members to develop and promote their own P/CVE content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID)</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pcid.com.ph/">http://www.pcid.com.ph/</a></td>
<td>The PCID seeks to elevate the voices of the Bangsamoro in the Philippines, enabling their meaningful participation in both the global discourse on Islam and democracy and the struggle for self-determination and development. The PCID has helped organize several forums and focus group discussions in the Philippines and the region around P/CVE, with a particular emphasis on the role of women and community resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and research</td>
<td>Transnational Initiative Countering Violent Extremism (TICVE)</td>
<td>Morocco, Mali, and Tunisia</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ticve.org/">http://www.ticve.org/</a></td>
<td>TICVE is a Casablanca-based organization established to promote sustainable peace through building youth resilience in communities susceptible to radicalization. It engages in two streams of P/CVE programming: education and action research. TICVE's research aims to better understand the phenomenon of violent extremism, identifying ideologies, and vulnerable populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interfaith</td>
<td>Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK)</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td><a href="http://interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/">http://interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/</a></td>
<td>The IRCK is a coalition of all major faith communities in Kenya that work together to deepen interfaith dialogue and collaboration among members to mobilize the unique moral and social resources of religious people and address shared concerns. The IRCK’s Peace and National Cohesion Program promotes peace, reconciliation, and cohesion among Kenyan communities and their neighbors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interfaith</td>
<td>Peace Catalyst International</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td><a href="https://www.peacecatalyst.org">https://www.peacecatalyst.org</a></td>
<td>This organization is building interfaith working groups across the United States between Muslim and Christian groups to counter narratives propagating radicalization to violence. The working groups will empower grassroots leaders to implement and evaluate countering violent extremism actions. The project focuses on preventing both violent Islamist extremism and violent extremism against Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement/Trust-building</td>
<td>Global Peace Foundation</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td><a href="https://www.globalpeace.org">https://www.globalpeace.org</a></td>
<td>The Global Peace Foundation provides training and fosters community engagement in New Jersey to counter terrorist recruitment by 1) raising awareness of the frontline law enforcement workers and community leaders on indicators connected to violent extremism through train-the-trainer programs; and 2) strengthening community and law enforcement partnerships to counter violent extremism through community engagement events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation and Transnational Justice</td>
<td>Partners Kosova Center for Conflict Management</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/partnerskosova/">https://www.facebook.com/partnerskosova/</a></td>
<td>Partners Kosova offers mediation services and training of local government officials and elected municipal representatives in leadership and citizen participation and reconciliation processes. It is also the lead Kosovar CSO in the EU-supported regional CSO hub for P/CVE being developed in the Western Balkans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/CVE Plans of Action</td>
<td>Open Doors</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/opendoorsalbania/">https://www.facebook.com/opendoorsalbania/</a></td>
<td>Open Doors supports the implementation of the national strategy on countering violent extremism in the Elbasan region through organizing an awareness campaign in the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/CVE Plans of Action</td>
<td>Human Rights Agenda (HURIA)</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/humanrightsagenda/">https://www.facebook.com/humanrightsagenda/</a></td>
<td>HURIA is a human rights organization based in coastal Kenya that facilitated the development of the Kwale County plan of action on P/CVE, working with Kenya’s National Counter-Terrorism Center, county officials, and community groups. It also organized the First County Colloquium on CVE at the Kenya School of Government in Matuga, Kwale County in early 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>UET Centre</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td><a href="http://www.uetcentre.org/portal/">http://www.uetcentre.org/portal/</a></td>
<td>The UET Centre is implementing a project aimed at improving local media capacities to fight religiously-motivated violent extremism in Elbasan. It is supporting media as a key factor to increase dialogue with civil society and local authorities, and supporting community and youth contributing to the prevention of violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Young Power in Social Action (YPSA)</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td><a href="http://yps.org">http://yps.org</a></td>
<td>YPSA, a GCERF grantee, works with more than 500,000 undocumented Rohingya migrants who have fled neighboring Myanmar. YPSA seeks to create a society where everyone’s basic needs and rights are ensured to help prevent youth recruitment into extremist groups. YPSA developed new material to explain violent extremism, promote non-violence, and highlight how people from different religions and cultures can coexist peacefully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Organization for the Prevention of Violence</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td><a href="http://www.preventviolence.ca">http://www.preventviolence.ca</a></td>
<td>The Organization for the Prevention of Violence is a community and expert-led NGO that engages in research and prevention-based activities that aim to mitigate hate-motivated violence, including violent extremism. It works closely with communities, human service providers, and all levels of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Musa al-Saket Development Organization (MASDO)</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td><a href="https://arab.org/directory/musa-alsaket-development-organization/">https://arab.org/directory/musa-alsaket-development-organization/</a></td>
<td>Focusing on youth and women’s empowerment in marginalized communities in Jordan, MASDO is implementing a Mercy Corps project that provides psycho-social interventions that teach youth to manage their emotions related to feelings of injustice and hopelessness. The program avoids discussing violent extremism or religion, focusing instead on stress relief, self-awareness, and community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Fighters For Peace</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td><a href="http://fightersforpeace.org">http://fightersforpeace.org</a></td>
<td>Through their personal stories of transformation from being fighters in a war to becoming fighters for peace, this Lebanese NGO works to prevent youth from choosing the path of violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Qadims Lumiere School and College</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td><a href="http://www.icanpeacework.org/2017/09/27/pakistani-peacebuilder-bushra-hyder-fighting-off-call-jihad-rohingya/">http://www.icanpeacework.org/2017/09/27/pakistani-peacebuilder-bushra-hyder-fighting-off-call-jihad-rohingya/</a></td>
<td>This private school places a heavy emphasis on its peace curriculum, introduced in 2009, which includes education on a variety of religions and cultures. The aim is to prevent students from turning to violence. The school’s director has lobbied to get other schools in the region and country to implement similar curricula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Brottsförebyggande Centrum i Värmland (BFC)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bfciv.se">http://www.bfciv.se</a></td>
<td>A non-profit organization, the BFC’s (Crime Prevention Centre in Värmland) primary purpose is to counter all forms of racism, intolerance, and politically motivated violence. It brings together schools, police, the Social Insurance Agency, the Public Employment Service, social services, and recreation facilities to counter violent extremism based on the roles and responsibilities of each organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Tim Parry, Jonathan Ball Peace Center</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td><a href="https://foundation4peace.org">https://foundation4peace.org</a></td>
<td>This UK charity implements “Radical Dialogue,” a 30-hour accredited course in northern England that brings together members of the local community, local charities, NGOs, and members of other civil society groups, to address different forms of extremism, hate crimes, prejudice, and discrimination. Radical Dialogue is designed to facilitate dialogue on difficult issues and to promote innovative grassroots solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Educate Against Hate</td>
<td>UK/Global</td>
<td><a href="https://educateagainsthate.com">https://educateagainsthate.com</a></td>
<td>Educate Against Hate is an online platform to provide practical advice, support, and resources to protect children from violent extremism and radicalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Crisis Intervention of Houston, Inc.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td><a href="https://www.crisishotline.org/">https://www.crisishotline.org/</a></td>
<td>Focusing on all forms of violent extremism, Crisis Intervention trains crisis counselors in violent extremism risk factors and in protocols to steer callers to the crisis hotline to the appropriate resources for help. It also seeks to reach young, at-risk populations targeted by violent extremism, using online public awareness campaigns, social media, community centers, and other means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison</td>
<td>Security Reform Initiative (SRI)</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td><a href="http://www.securityreforminitiative.org">http://www.securityreforminitiative.org</a></td>
<td>The SRI engages the security sector in advocating for key policy and institutional reforms. It developed a training module on gender and cultural sensitivity for frontline officials in the Bureau of Corrections and the Bureau of Jail and Management Penology. The module aims to increase awareness and strengthen their capacity in dealing with violent extremist offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>HAYAT</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td><a href="https://hayat-deutschland.de/english/">https://hayat-deutschland.de/english/</a></td>
<td>Since January 2012, HAYAT has been the partner of the German Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlings BAMF), which established a national counseling hotline on radicalization (Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung). Taking calls from relatives and other concerned persons, the hotline provides a first line assessment and then redirects the calls to local, non-governmental partners like Hayat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-SAVE)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td><a href="http://csave.org/en/home-en/">http://csave.org/en/home-en/</a></td>
<td>C-SAVE is a network of civil society organizations collaborating to address violent extremism in Indonesia. Among other initiatives, it is providing skills training for prison staff to support the disen-gagement and rehabilitation of terrorist inmates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil (LPMS) Poso</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td><a href="http://lpmspososulteng.blogspot.com/2010/10/profil-lembaga-penguatan-masyarakat.html">http://lpmspososulteng.blogspot.com/2010/10/profil-lembaga-penguatan-masyarakat.html</a></td>
<td>LPMS Poso is working to build the capacity of other grassroots CSOs to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders in Poso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>Instituti për Siguri, Integrim dhe Deradikalizim (INSID)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td><a href="https://insid-kosovo.org">https://insid-kosovo.org</a></td>
<td>INSID addresses violent extremism, Islamophobia, and other intolerant views, while intervening to support affected individuals and communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>Rescue Me</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td><a href="https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/lebanon/peacebuilding-organisations/rescue-me-crime-prevention/">https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/lebanon/peacebuilding-organisations/rescue-me-crime-prevention/</a></td>
<td>An NGO focused on violent crimes and violence prevention, Rescue Me’s co-founders, Nancy and Mary Yammout, have interviewed more than 70 prisoners in Roumieh prison accused of violent extremism and related charges to develop a behavioral analysis profile of these individuals. The information is then integrated into vocational training opportunities, including social media, expressive art, and psycho-social support programming with youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>Community Coalition for Peace and the Promotion of Living Together (COPAVE)</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td><a href="http://snpve.org/ug/">http://snpve.org/ug/</a></td>
<td>COPAVE addresses group stigmatization and promotes community involvement in P/CVE. It seeks to build trust between the government and historically marginalized communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wanep.org/wanep/">http://www.wanep.org/wanep/</a></td>
<td>WANEP is a network of peacebuilding organizations across West Africa that is helping to build the capacity of CSOs to design and implement rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives and to strengthen collaboration between state governments and CSOs in Nigeria to support their implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>Muslim Centre for Justice and Law (MCJL)</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td><a href="http://mcjl.ug">http://mcjl.ug</a></td>
<td>MCJL is a CSO that seeks to build the capacity of civil society and community leaders in the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders in Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
<td>United Religious Initiative–Great Lakes (URI-GL)</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td><a href="http://www.uri-greatlakes.org/who-we-are.html">http://www.uri-greatlakes.org/who-we-are.html</a></td>
<td>URI-GL is working to build the capacity of religious and community actors in the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders and returning foreign terrorist offenders in Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Engagement - Internet</td>
<td>Fol Tash (Speak Now)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td><a href="http://www.foltash.com">http://www.foltash.com</a></td>
<td>Fol Tash is an online media portal founded by a group of Islamic theologians, imams, journalists, and researchers who believed that the official Islamic body, the “Islamic Community of Kosovo,” was not proactive enough in confronting the rise of violent extremist ideologies. The website (<a href="http://www.foltash.com">www.foltash.com</a>) provides sections on the Quran and Islamic Sciences, with short contributions on key questions and debates, as well as articles on the latest news.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Religious Leaders | Indonesian Institute for Society Empowerment (INSEP) | Indonesia | http://insep.or.id | INSEP is working to increase religious leaders’ participation in the rehabilitation and reintegra-
tion of former terrorist offenders. Through a number of workshops, INSEP strengthens the role and capacity of preachers, mosque administrators, and religious educators in an effort to produce religious counter-radicalization narratives. |
| Religious Leaders, Youth Empowerment | Information Network and Active Citizenship (INAC) | Albania | https://inac.org.al | INAC promotes tolerance within religious commu-
nities through the use of media, empowers youth, and promotes and enhances civil education and the culture of tolerance and nonviolence. |
| Research | Iman Research | Malaysia | http://www.imanresearch.com | IMAN Research is a social enterprise focusing on research and community engagement. It is devel-
oping a civil society electronic resource center on rehabilitation and reintegation, and P/CVE more broadly. |
| Resilience | Tuesday’s Children | Global | https://www.tuesdayschildren.org/programs/project-common-bond/ | Project Common Bond is a program that brings to-
tgether young adults, ages 15 to 20, from around the world who share a “common bond” — the loss of a family member due to an act of terrorism, violent extremism, or war. |
| Resilience | The Timbuktu Renaissance (TR) Initiative | Mali | https://www.facebook.com/timbukturenaissance/ | The TR Initiative aims to foster peace, unity, reconciliation, and economic development in countering violent extremism. It aims to leverage Mali’s and particularly, Timbuktu’s heritage and living culture, to promote peace and prosperity. The TR Initiative’s integrated strategy will boost Mali’s creative industries (tourism, literature, architecture, music, film, and artisan crafts) and mobilize investment for sustainable economic de-
velopment initiatives ranging from education and agriculture to renewable energy and transparent natural resource development. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</th>
<th>WEBSITE</th>
<th>FOCUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resilience and Reconciliation</td>
<td>Carefronting</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td><a href="http://carefronting.org">http://carefronting.org</a></td>
<td>Carefronting works with and provides training for CSOs in Borno State on trauma consciousness and resilience, community cohesion, forgiveness, and reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>The Islamic Education Trust's Dawah Institute of Nigeria (DIN)</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td><a href="https://dawahinstitute.org">https://dawahinstitute.org</a></td>
<td>DIN develops and distributes relevant literature and audio material, and trains religious leaders and actors in faith-based critical thinking tools through a “train the trainers” program. Its work focuses on promoting social justice and peaceful coexistence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Association Jeunesse de la Paix et Non-Violence (AJPNV)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/AJPNV/">https://www.facebook.com/AJPNV/</a></td>
<td>AJPNV supports the rehabilitation of victims of violence and violent extremism by providing them with free medical, psycho-social, and legal support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>BALAY Rehabilitation center</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td><a href="https://balayph.net">https://balayph.net</a></td>
<td>The BALAY Rehabilitation Center provides psycho-social services and advocacy support to persons deprived of liberty due to political circumstances, and survivors of torture and other forms of organized political violence. This includes political prisoners and individuals and communities displaced by wars and armed conflicts. It also provides services to survivors of massacres and extra-judicial killings, and their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Womex</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td><a href="http://www.womex.org/en">http://www.womex.org/en</a></td>
<td>“WomEX” is the result of a two-year project focused on gender as a decisive factor for extremism. WomEX supports girls and young women in their disengagement process from right-wing extremism. The organization also offers training on gendered pathways to disengagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Seeking Modern Applications for Real Transformations (SMART)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td><a href="http://www.smartngo.org/">http://www.smartngo.org/</a></td>
<td>SMART runs centers for mothers in the conflict areas of Assam, Kashmir, and Jharkhand. It set up a community radio station, Radio Mewat, in Nuh, Haryana, that has allowed community members to air grievances against the local government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Persatuan Kesedaran Komuniti Selangor (EMPOWER)</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td><a href="https://empowermalaysia.org">https://empowermalaysia.org</a></td>
<td>EMPOWER seeks to advance women’s political equality through research projects that explore trends, patterns, and impact of extremist speech and actions directed at women’s freedom of expression and its contribution to an environment conducive to violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ateneo.edu/gaston-z-ortigas-peace-institute">http://www.ateneo.edu/gaston-z-ortigas-peace-institute</a>; <a href="https://gzopi.wordpress.com">https://gzopi.wordpress.com</a></td>
<td>This organization works with youth, women, indigenous people, and other marginalized groups to broaden the discourse on non-violent solutions to armed conflicts in the Philippines. The Institute has examined women’s perspectives on violent extremism in three provinces in the Bangsamoro region affected by violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women &amp; Children</td>
<td>Mitra Wacana - Women Resource Center (WRC)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td><a href="https://mitrawacana.or.id">https://mitrawacana.or.id</a></td>
<td>WRC is focused on raising awareness about women’s and children’s rights, and is implementing a project with the aim to increase women’s awareness of violent extremism on the local level in the Kulon Progo district through trainings in nine villages across three sub-districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women &amp; Youth</td>
<td>JUHUDI (Justice Humanity Dignity) Center</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td><a href="http://www.juhudicenter.org/index.php">http://www.juhudicenter.org/index.php</a></td>
<td>The Juhudi Center works with women- and youth-led organizations. The JUHUDI Center has become an umbrella network of 18 grassroots organizations and 78 informal unregistered grassroots groups operating in the administrative counties of Tana River, Kwale, Mombasa, Lamu, and Kilifi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women &amp; Youth</td>
<td>Together We Build It</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td><a href="https://togetherwebuildit.org">https://togetherwebuildit.org</a></td>
<td>Together We Build It supports a peaceful democratic transition in Libya, through empowering women and youth to participate in the political and public sphere, and emphasizing the relevant role of women and youth in peace-building processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Center for Youth Progress</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td><a href="http://cyp.ai">http://cyp.ai</a></td>
<td>The Center for Youth Progress empowers local youth groups to address and prevent extremism and radicalization within high schools. It brings together first-line practitioners, youth workers, educators, parents, high school students, community police officers, child protection and health care workers, and other key actors at the local level, to build capacities to learn about identity and have a better understanding of the roots of extremism and radicalization, contributing to the prevention of violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Youth Center Perspektiva</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td><a href="https://perspektiva4youth.org">https://perspektiva4youth.org</a></td>
<td>Youth Center Perspektiva focuses on youth empowerment and human rights via artistic and educational activities. The center implemented a project entitled “One Step Together: Increasing Resilience of Young People to Radicalization” that sought to boost the resilience of young people to radicalization in the areas of Dibër, Elbasan, and Kukës through human rights education, peer-to-peer empowerment, and the use of counter-narratives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Police And Citizens Youth Clubs (PCYC) NSW</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td><a href="https://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/communities/compact_program/">https://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/communities/compact_program/</a></td>
<td>PCYC NSW, in partnership with the NSW Police, local schools, and the community, breaks down the religious, ideological, and political barriers that prevent young people from engaging in sport, recreational, education, and leadership activities in their communities. It coordinates youth-based extracurricular community programs and activities from the PCYC. Young people identified as needing more intensive interventions will be referred to Police Youth Case Managers for targeted proactive programs based on “good policing” rather than “more policing.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Youth Led Social Cohesion</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td><a href="https://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/communities/compact/compact_program/">https://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/communities/compact/compact_program/</a></td>
<td>The Youth Led Social Cohesion project will equip 24,000 high school students with the skills and mindsets to contribute constructively to building a more socially cohesive society. Through the High Resolves Global Citizens program, these young people will gain a better understanding of the essential need to respect people who are different from them and embrace diversity. Students will also develop critical thinking skills to question divisive and intolerant messages and take the lead in driving positive change in their communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Sydney Youth Connect with Coexistence Inc.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td><a href="https://www.sydneyyouthconnect.com/">https://www.sydneyyouthconnect.com/</a></td>
<td>Sydney Youth Connect runs the “Who I Am?” program within schools across New South Wales. The program is designed to facilitate positive change and growth in young people. It relies on multi-faceted participation from a variety of stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Association of Viennese Youth Centres</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jugendzentren.at/media/1393/factsheet.pdf">http://www.jugendzentren.at/media/1393/factsheet.pdf</a></td>
<td>The Association of Viennese Youth Centres is the largest professional provider of children and youth services in Vienna; it currently operates 40 institutions and projects with a staff of approximately 300 people. It engages in a range of areas, including “open children and youth work”—which is aimed at enabling self-expression and self-efficiency, and creating a welcoming environment in which youth can grow—in youth centers and clubs, and offers services and that focus on artistic-creative activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Local Youth Corner (LOYOC)</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td><a href="http://www.loyocameroon.org">http://www.loyocameroon.org</a></td>
<td>LOYOC empowers youth as agents of rehabilitation and reintegration for people with a history of, or propensity for, violence in Cameroon. It spearheaded the development of a Youth Action Agenda for the promotion of rehabilitation and reintegration in Cameroon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>The Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF)</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td><a href="https://irfront.net">https://irfront.net</a></td>
<td>IRF focuses on youth empowerment by examining the vulnerabilities and increasing influences of violent extremism on young women in universities and other higher-learning institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Forum MNE</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td><a href="http://www.forum-mne.com/">http://www.forum-mne.com/</a></td>
<td>Forum MNE supports the development of young people into conscious, responsible, and active individuals and citizens capable of recognizing, seeking, and realizing their rights, while contributing to the development of a just and peaceful society. Forum MNE, in cooperation with five CSOs from the Western Balkans, is implementing a three-year project to create a CSO hub for P/CVE in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Straathoekwerk in Zaanstad (SWZ)/ Street Corner Work</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ggdzw.nl/jeugd_en_gezin/straathoekwerk">https://www.ggdzw.nl/jeugd_en_gezin/straathoekwerk</a></td>
<td>SWZ works with young people between the ages of 12 and 25 who have issues with school or work, finances, drugs, and housing, and as a result get into self-destructive behavior including delinquency and violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Pakistan Youth Alliance</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pya.org.pk/about/">http://www.pya.org.pk/about/</a>; <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/PakistanYouthAlliance/about/?ref=page_internal">https://www.facebook.com/pg/PakistanYouthAlliance/about/?ref=page_internal</a></td>
<td>Pakistan Youth Alliance is a youth-based and youth-administered organization that aims to unite the youth of Pakistan, irrespective of their religion, ethnicity, caste, race, or language. It offers an unbiased platform for youth to contribute to nation-building processes in their limited capabilities. It is run by a network of progressive youth activists with a track record of six years of work against violent extremism, along with support for human rights and material relief of disaster victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Center for Community Awareness</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td><a href="http://ccasom.org/">http://ccasom.org/</a></td>
<td>The Center for Community Awareness promotes cultural awareness and social consciousness, and provides outreach opportunities. The goal is to make lasting connections between youth and the community with the aim to improve the living standards of people in poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Young Leaders Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/Youngleadersentrepreneurs/">https://www.facebook.com/Youngleadersentrepreneurs/</a></td>
<td>Young Leaders Entrepreneurs convenes hackathons, boot-camps, and startups to support the Tunisian democratic transition by investing in youth entrepreneurship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Radical Middle Way (RMW)</td>
<td>UK/Global</td>
<td><a href="http://impacteurope.eu/partners/radical-middle-way/">http://impacteurope.eu/partners/radical-middle-way/</a></td>
<td>RMW is a not-for-profit community interest company promoting a mainstream understanding of Islam that young people can relate to. Working alongside grassroots partners, RMW creates platforms for open debate, critical thinking, and spiritual reflection. It provides tools to its audiences to counter exclusion and violence, and encourages positive civic action. Over 75,000 people have participated in projects in the UK alone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Beyond Skin</td>
<td>UK/Northern Ireland</td>
<td><a href="http://www.beyonddskin.net/">http://www.beyonddskin.net/</a></td>
<td>Beyond Skin uses music, art, and radio as instruments for mediating and improving social and cultural problems, with the overall aim of addressing issues of racism and violent sectarianism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Heartland Democracy Center</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td><a href="https://heartlanddemocracy.org">https://heartlanddemocracy.org</a></td>
<td>The Heartland Democracy Center works with youth in the Somali community of Minnesota, which is part of the broader “Minnesota model” for CVE. This project offers intervention activities in addition to those that develop individual- or community-level resilience to recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>University of San Diego</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sandiego.edu">http://www.sandiego.edu</a></td>
<td>The University of San Diego is leading an initiative aimed at increasing community resilience to violent extremism by building the capacity of CSOs to engage constructively with Somali and Iraqi youth in refugee communities in San Diego and El Cajon, California. The project seeks to build trust between law enforcement and youth to prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Alf Ba Association - Civic Coexistence</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/Alf-Ba-Civilization-and-Coexistence-Foundation-462856367083043/">https://www.facebook.com/Alf-Ba-Civilization-and-Coexistence-Foundation-462856367083043/</a></td>
<td>Alfa Ba Association holds P/CVE awareness trainings for youth on topics such as the negative implications of joining a violent extremist group. These trainings target high school students and are part of its wider youth engagement focus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, Alternative Narrative</td>
<td>SAVE: Standing Against Violent Extremism</td>
<td>US/Global</td>
<td><a href="https://www.busave.org">https://www.busave.org</a></td>
<td>SAVE is a campaign planned and implemented by Boston University students that counters violent extremism through education. Through social media, SAVE believes it has the power to spread hate or spread love. SAVE created the #One Click to Campaign, involving social media influencers, and created YouTube content to raise awareness to prevent and counter violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth &amp; Community</td>
<td>BEDER</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/BederTunisia">https://www.facebook.com/pg/BederTunisia</a></td>
<td>BEDER promotes democracy and good governance as well as human rights. In cooperation with UNESCO, BEDER recently launched the project “Prevention of Violent Extremism through Youth Empowerment in Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, Counter-Messaging</td>
<td>People Against Violent Extremism (PAVE)</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td><a href="http://pave.net.au/who-we-are">http://pave.net.au/who-we-are</a></td>
<td>PAVE launched a social media campaign, “Violent extremism has many faces,” aimed at raising public awareness of violent extremism by using visuals that depict a variety of violent extremists, such as right wing nationalists and Islamist extremists. Although the campaign receives funding support from the Australian government, the campaign’s central message competes with dominant messaging that defines violent extremism as primarily an Islamic issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, Prevention</td>
<td>Youth of Osh Organization</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youthofosh.kg">https://www.youthofosh.kg</a></td>
<td>The Youth of Osh Public Organization was established in 2008 to help develop young people as active citizens in Kyrgyzstan by strengthening their capacities and promoting their interests in the community. The organization promotes educational leadership and offers various peace-building programs. The organization’s current project, “DREAM-Democracy and religion, dialogue between equal and moderate voices,” brings together various stakeholders to discuss the role of religion and its emotional connotations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</td>
<td>WEBSITE</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, Prevention</td>
<td>Khudi</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/khudipakistan/">https://www.facebook.com/khudipakistan/</a></td>
<td>Khudi is a counter-extremism social movement working to promote a democratic culture in Pakistan. It aims to provide a platform to address social issues through cultural and creative avenues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth/Research</td>
<td>Fondacioni Arsimor Shqiptar</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/fashfanpage/">https://www.facebook.com/fashfanpage/</a></td>
<td>Fondacioni Arsimor Shqiptar supports university students to undertake field research and write short policy briefs on contributing factors to violent extremism, FTFs, and the potential consequences of violent extremism in the city of Shkodra.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Roadmap to Progress
APPENDIX TWO

**RUSI-Led Prevention Project II Research Methodology**

RUSI is currently conducting a macro-level data collection and literature review focused on evaluation and monitoring material across different preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) interventions. The parameters of investigation were originally comprehensive in geographic and operational terms, including projects and programs that tackle diverse forms of violent extremism, from ‘Salafi-Jihadism’ to ultra-nationalist and far-right militancy; and without any prerequisite time-horizons, allowing the inclusion of completed, ongoing, and new interventions. Importantly, the quality of evidence was not an inclusion criterion at this initial stage due to the shortage of independent, outcome-level evaluations, as noted by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. Instead a mix of academic studies, policy papers, and grey literature alongside evaluation material (public and private) was collated for review.

The collected material was then triaged in alignment with a revised version of the public health model, stratifying between three tiers of intervention: “Primary”, “Secondary” and “Tertiary.” While all three categories were included in the initial search, the secondary strand – countering violent extremism – received exclusive attention in the follow-up analysis. This incorporates any data and documentation of initiatives that target vulnerable populations, articulate explicit CVE objectives in their theory of change or intervention logic, or address identified factors contributing to violent extremism in a particular context. Relevant material adhering to these parameters are in the process of being classified through a rapid evidence assessment, with the team creating a hierarchy to weigh the reliability of evidence based on various criteria including, but not limited to, the veracity of a document’s conceptual framing, its transparency and independence, method, research design, validity, and cogency. This framework was developed with reference to analogous models in the fields of peace-building and development, but has been specifically adapted to reflect the conceptual, methodological, and political nuances of P/CVE research and evaluation.

Alongside this ongoing literature review, the Royal United Services Institute has also further expanded its existing database mapping the CVE landscape, which now contains more than 1,400 projects conducted by approximately 900 organizations across 100 countries to ensure interventions at a global level are adequately captured. Collectively these various research strands, supplemented with key informant interviews and fieldwork across a number of case studies, will feed into phase II of the Prevention Project with the aim of systematically identifying and assessing what works and what does not in the P/CVE space, given its diagnosed limitations. This research should provide a level of granularity and detail to the broader dynamics and P/CVE ‘state of play’ captured in this report, allowing an interrogation of the assumptions, theories of change, and the evidence-base underpinning preventive best practice, so practitioners, policy-makers, and donors continue to refine, adapt, and strengthen the field.

---


168 Primary: Broad-based, mass prevention programs addressing a range of social grievances including, but not specifically focusing on, factors contributing to violent extremism. Secondary: ‘counter-violent extremism activities’ that either target ‘at risk’ populations/individuals or address individual incentives, enabling factors and structural motivators identified as driving violent extremist radicalization/recruitment. Tertiary: counterterrorism, disengagement and deradicalization initiatives engaging with violent extremists or members of violent extremist organizations.
THE PREVENTION PROJECT
The Prevention Project: Organizing against Violent Extremism was launched in March 2016 to help operationalize and sustain a “whole of society” approach to preventing and countering violent extremism. Working with government and non-governmental actors around the globe, it provides practical guidance on how to strengthen P/CVE policies and programs, with an emphasis on promoting the role and enhancing of the contributions of civil society and collaboration between national and local actors in this field. Project partners have included the Brookings Institution, the Geneva Centre on Security Policy, the Global Center on Cooperative Security, the International Civil Society Action Network, the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, the Department of International Relations and Politics at Oxford University, and the Royal United Services Institute.

THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE (RUSI)
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Its mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world. With offices in London, Brussels and Nairobi, RUSI is a research-led institute, producing independent, practical and innovative analysis to address today’s complex challenges, including conflict, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism.